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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Stop into any bodega in Brooklyn, New York, and there is sure to be soda 
sweetened with corn syrup.1  In Brooklyn alone, about “139 million gallons of soda 
are consumed each year, sweetened by 20,000 acres of corn.”2  Driving a cab 
through his Brooklyn neighborhood of Fifth Ave. and Park Slope, Fray Mendez 
reminisces about “Colonial Grape,” the “sweetest grape soda [he] ever drank.”3  At 
                                                          
 1 KING CORN (Mosaic Films, Inc. 2007).  In a documentary tracing the overproduction 
and subsidization of the corn industry in America, Ian Cheney and Curt Ellis attempt to trace 
where the nation’s surplus corn ends up.  Id.  Cheney and Ellis discover that for each kernel of 
corn produced, there is a 70% chance it will end up sweetening a beverage.  Id.   
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.  This soda is also known as “Old Colony Uva”, and high fructose corn syrup is the 
second listed ingredient.  SAM’S CLUB, http://www.samsclub.com/sams/old-colony-grape-
soda-11-27-fl-oz-24-pk/prod10640273.ip  (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).  
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his peak, he drank two liters of the soda each day, maybe more.4  At that time, Fray 
was also over 300 pounds, a size sixty in pants, and completely unaware that 
drinking soda was a problem.5  Although he lost approximately 100 pounds by 
eliminating soda from his diet, Fray was recently diagnosed with type 2 diabetes.6  
Unfortunately, he is no stranger to the disease.  Fray’s parents and grandmother died 
as a direct result of their diabetes and his sister has been a diabetic for years.7  Fray 
recalls the pain his father had in his toe for six months before being diagnosed with 
diabetes.8  He describes how his father had his toe amputated; then his foot, his leg 
below the knee, and finally his leg above the knee.9  When doctors wanted to begin 
amputating his other leg, Fray’s father had had enough and gave up.10  
                                                          
 4 KING CORN, supra note 1.  A single 11.27 fl. oz. can of Old Colony Uva contains 53 g 
of sugar.  SAM’S CLUB, supra note 3.  Therefore, drinking two liters of the grape soda is 
equivalent to consuming 0.70 lbs. of sugar.  
 5 Id.   
 6 KING CORN, supra note 1.  Type 2 diabetes is a chronic condition that affects the way a 
person’s body processes sugar (or glucose).  Type 2 Diabetes: Definition, MAYO CLINIC, 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/type-2-diabetes/DS00585 (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).  
“With type 2 diabetes, [a person’s] body either resists the effects of insulin—a hormone that 
regulates the movement of sugar into . . . cells—or doesn’t produce enough insulin to maintain 
a normal glucose level.”  Id.  Because glucose is the body’s main energy source, the inability 
of insulin to facilitate glucose’s entry into cells means that those cells are not getting the fuel 
they need to properly function.  Diabetes Health Center, Causes of Type 2 Diabetes, WEBMD, 
http://diabetes.webmd.com/guide/diabetes-causes (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).  When glucose 
is unable to enter cells, it begins to accumulate in the blood, a condition called hyperglycemia.  
Type 2 Diabetes, MEDLINEPLUS, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000313.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).  
Diabetes is clinically confirmed by meeting at least two of the following test criteria or 
repeating the test on different days: (1) a blood glucose level of at least 126 milligrams per 
deciliter after an overnight fast; (2) a non-fasting glucose level greater than or equal to 200 
milligrams per deciliter with symptoms of diabetes; (3) a glucose level of at least 200 
milligrams per deciliter on a 2-hour glucose tolerance test, or (4) a blood sugar (A1C) test of 
at least 6.5%.  Diabetes Health Center, supra; see also Type 2 Diabetes: Definition, MAYO 
CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/type-2-diabetes/DS00585/DSECTION=tests-and-
diagnosis (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
 7 KING CORN, supra note 1.   
 8 Id. 
 9 Id.  Consistently high blood sugar levels can damage nerve fibers throughout the body, 
leading to a condition known as diabetic neuropathy. Guido R. Zanni, Diabetic Neuropathy 
Symptoms and Treatment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 9, 2013), 
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/health-wellness/articles/2013/11/09/diabetic-
neuropathy-symptoms-and-treatment.  Approximately “60 to 70[%] of people with diabetes 
have some form of neuropathy,” the most common of which is peripheral neuropathy.  
Diabetic Neuropathies: The Nerve Damage of Diabetes, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERV’S, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH 1 (2009) 
http://diabetes.niddk.nih.gov/dm/pubs/neuropathies/Neuropathies_508.pdf.  Peripheral 
neuropathy causes pain or loss of feeling in the peripheral extremities, such as the toes, feet, 
and legs.  Id. at 3.  “Initially, it affects the foot” and “eventually spreads to the ankle and leg.”  
Zanni, supra note 9.  Because of nerve damage, patients do not feel pain and may be unaware 
of foot injuries, resulting in open sores.  Id.  These open sores may then become infected and 
in the most severe cases, lead to amputation of the toes or foot.  Id.  The natural progression of 
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Fray’s story is a stark reality for many Americans, as we have become a society 
that walks less and eats more.  As a culture, we have decreased the importance of 
physical activity, while simultaneously creating an unhealthy food environment.11  
Unfortunately for Fray, he may be without a legal remedy to sue to the makers of his 
favorite grape soda.  Judicially created thresholds of admissibility for scientific 
evidence have made it increasingly difficult for food plaintiffs12 to prove that a 
certain food ingredient, such as high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), caused their type 2 
diabetes. 
Because obesity and its associated health problems have been largely attributed 
to poor self-control, laziness, and various other personal failings, society has been 
unwilling to assign blame to food manufacturers for their role in contributing to this 
problem.  But, as consumers are becoming more aware of the significantly harmful 
effect that poor diets can have on a person’s heath, the scales may be tipping in favor 
of bringing “Big Food”13 to court.  
Food manufacturers, however, are not exactly vulnerable.  Armed with precedent 
disputing the causal link between consumption of fast food and adverse health 
effects,14 judicially-created barriers to admitting epidemiologic evidence,15 and the 
defense of personal responsibility,16 food plaintiffs face an uphill battle. 
This Comment explores that reality.  It examines the various challenges that 
consumers face in holding food manufacturers liable for the dietary impact allegedly 
causing obesity-related health conditions.  Part I briefly traces the emergence of 
HFCS in America’s food supply and examines its possible role in the development 
of type 2 diabetes.  It discusses previous litigation against the food industry for 
                                                          
diabetic neuropathy is irreversible loss of sensation in the feet, “leading to ulceration and/or 
amputation in 15[%] of patients.”  Oskar Aszmann, Patsy L. Tassler & A. Lee Dellon, 
Changing the Natural History of Diabetic Neuropathy: Incidence of Ulcer/Amputation in the 
Contralateral Limb of Patients with a Unilateral Nerve Decompression Procedure, 53 
ANNALS OF PLASTIC SURGERY 517, 517 (2004). 
 10 KING CORN, supra note 1.   
 11 See generally KELLY D. BROWNELL, FOOD FIGHT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FOOD 
INDUSTRY, AMERICA’S OBESITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 8–9 (McGraw-Hill 
2004).  Scientists, James Hill and John Peters argue “the current epidemic of obesity is largely 
caused by an environment that promotes excessive foot intake and discourages physical 
activity.”  James O. Hill & John C. Peters, Environmental Contributions to the Obesity 
Epidemic, 280 SCIENCE, 1371, 1371–74 (1998).  Consequently, it is unsurprising that 
America’s children are consuming record amounts of fat, sugar, and fast food.  BROWNELL, 
supra, at 11.  
 12 This Comment uses the phrase “food plaintiffs” to generally refer to litigants who bring 
lawsuits against food manufacturers for allegedly causing their obesity related health 
conditions. 
 13 Defined as the “‘large food companies and legacy brands on which millions of 
consumers have relied on for so long.’”  Phil Wahba, Campbell Soup CEO Says Distrust of 
‘Big Food’ a Growing Problem, FORTUNE (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://time.com/3714572/campbell-soup-ceo-says-distrust-of-big-food-a-growing-problem/. 
 14 See infra Part II.B. 
 15 See infra Part IV.A. 
 16 See infra Part II.B. 
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allegedly causing obesity and associated health conditions; the Comment then 
describes a recent lawsuit targeting manufacturers of HFCS for allegedly causing a 
young girl’s type 2 diabetes.  Part II highlights epidemiology’s role in demonstrating 
causation in product liability suits.  Part III examines the current standard of 
admissibility for epidemiologic evidence in products liability cases after Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.17  Additionally, it discusses how various courts 
have construed Daubert as authorizing the creation of judge-made quantitative 
thresholds for admitting epidemiologic evidence.18  Part IV proposes that these 
judicially created standards be abandoned and suggests alternative criteria for 
evaluating the reliability of an epidemiologic study offered into evidence.  Part V 
discusses various conduct-based defenses: assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, and comparative fault, which limit food manufacturers’ liability.  Part VI 
explores the potential for market share liability to provide food plaintiffs a remedy 
by relaxing the burden of proving causation.  Finally, Part VII highlights legislative 
attempts to curb food and beverage litigation, policy concerns, and the future of 
lawsuits targeting Big Food. 
 
II.  A RECENT LAWSUIT LINKING HFCS CONSUMPTION TO DIABETES IS REMINISCENT 
OF PELMAN V. MCDONALD’S CORP.  
 
In 1971, Japanese food scientists discovered a way to produce a sweetener 
cheaper than sugar called high fructose corn syrup (HFCS).19  HFCS is six times 
sweeter than cane sugar and could be made from corn.20  This was a boon to the corn 
industry, whose production rose to an all-time high in the mid-1970s.21  HFCS was 
economically produced from the huge surplus of corn grown by American farmers 
and thus significantly decreased the production costs of high-sugar products.22  
Initially, no warnings were raised about the significantly different metabolic path 
fructose takes in the human body.23  Whereas sucrose—or regular table sugar—is 
                                                          
 17 Daubert v. Merril Dow. Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 18 See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
 19 GREG CRISTER, FAT LAND: HOW AMERICANS BECAME THE FATTEST PEOPLE IN THE 
WORLD 10 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2003). 
 20 Id.  When commercial production of HFCS first began in 1967, its fructose content was 
approximately 15%.  Lee S. Gross, Li Li, Earl S. Ford & Simin Liu, Increased Consumption 
of Refined Carbohydrates and the Epidemic of Type 2 Diabetes in the United States: An 
Ecologic Assessment, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 774, 777 (2004).  After several 
modifications that altered the proportion of fructose in HFCS, various food and beverage 
manufacturers began using HFCS sweeteners with greater fructose content.  Id.  For example, 
HFCS with a 55% fructose content was used as the sweetener of the soft drink and ice cream 
industries.  Id.  Additionally, HFCS with a 90% fructose content “became a frequent choice 
for use in ‘natural’ and ‘light’ foods.”  Id. 
 21 CRISTER, supra note 19, at 10. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.  The digestive and absorptive processes are different for glucose–formed from the 
cleavage of sucrose–and fructose.  George A. Bray, Samara Joy Nielsen & Barry M. Popkin, 
Consumption of High-Fructose Corn Syrup in Beverages May Play a Role in the Epidemic of 
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chemically broken down before arriving in the liver, fructose bypasses this process 
and arrives in the liver almost completely intact.24  Although this feature of fructose, 
termed “metabolic shunting,” raised concern among food scientists, governmental 
bodies such as the USDA, did not explore the issue in depth.25   
Eventually, as mass production techniques made HFCS more readily available to 
food manufacturers, HFCS found its way into a wide assortment of foods: as a 
substitute for sucrose in carbonated drinks, candy, baked goods, canned fruits, and 
even dairy products.26  Because of its unique chemical attributes, HFCS could be 
used in frozen foods to prevent freezer burn and in baked goods to enhance their 
natural appearance.27  Indeed, corn syrup sweeteners now comprise greater than 20% 
of total daily carbohydrate intake, an increase of greater than 2100% since the 
beginning of the century.28 
 
A. The Possible Link Between HFCS and Global Diabetes Prevalence 
 
Increasing scientific evidence lends support to the hypothesis that fructose 
consumption increases diabetes risk.29  The increasing global prevalence of obesity 
and type 2 diabetes mirrors the worldwide increase in consumption of processed, 
Western style foods.30  The increased availability and consumption of HFCS-
                                                          
Obesity, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 537, 538 (2004).  Glucose and fructose are absorbed 
in different segments of the small intestine and once absorbed, are transported to the liver 
where the fructose can be converted to glucose or passed into circulation.  Id.  Addition of 
small amounts of fructose can help modulate liver metabolism.  Id.  However, ingestion of 
large amounts of fructose can potentially provide an unregulated source of precursors for fat 
synthesis in the liver.  Id.   
 24 CRISTER, supra note 19, at 11 (“Fructose, unlike sucrose . . . took a decidedly different 
route into the human metabolism.  Where the latter would go through a complex break down 
process before arriving in the human liver, the former, for some reason, bypassed that 
breakdown and arrived almost completely intact in the liver . . . . ”). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 10, 138; Bray et al., supra note 23, at 540.   
 27 CRISTER, supra note 19, at 10. 
 28 Gross et al., supra note 20, at 775–76.   
 29 Michael I. Goran et al., High Fructose Corn Syrup and Diabetes Prevalence: A Global 
Perspective, 8 GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 1, 56 (2012).  Using a multivariate nutrient-density 
model, researchers found that corn syrup consumption was positively associated with the 
prevalence of type 2 diabetes after controlling for total energy, fiber, fat, and protein intake.  
Gross et al., supra note 20, at 775.  There has been a study, however, which found no 
association between HFCS and adverse health consequences.  James M. Rippe & Theodore J. 
Angelopoulos, Sucrose, High-Fructose Corn Syrup, and Fructose, Their Metabolism and 
Potential Health Effects: What Do We Really Know?, 4 ADVANCES IN NUTRITION 236, 242 
(2013) (concluding that “there is no unique relationship between HFCS and obesity.”).  
However, the findings of that particular study are questionable in light of the researcher’s 
conflict of interest.  Id. at 236 n. 2 (“[Rippe’s] consulting fees [are] from ConAgra Foods, 
Pepsi Co International, Kraft Foods, the Corn Refiners Association, and Weigh Watchers 
International.”). 
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sweetened beverages is of particular concern because it provides an “an easy vehicle 
for excessive sugar intake.”31   
Amid increasing public health alarm at the “concurrent global epidemics” of 
obesity and type 2 diabetes, scientists began investigating the possible link between 
consumption of HFCS and the global rise in the prevalence of diabetes.32  
Researchers found that countries utilizing HFCS in their food supply as an 
alternative sweetener had a diabetes prevalence rate approximately 20% higher than 
in countries where HFCS is not used.33   
 
B. The Latest Battle in the Fight Against Big Food 
 
On June 17, 2013, a lawsuit was filed in a New York District Court on behalf of 
a fourteen-year-old girl claiming that HFCS caused her type 2 diabetes.34  This novel 
suit sought to hold HFCS manufacturers strictly liable for creating an unreasonably 
dangerous product, without warning consumers of its potential adverse health 
consequences, which include development of type 2 diabetes.35  The complaint 
alleged that defendants “knew or should have known that HFCS was a cause of type 
of diabetes” and deliberately concealed this fact.36  The plaintiff also claimed that the 
defendants were negligent “in their marketing, distribution, warning, testing and 
instructions to . . . consumers of the risks associated with the consumption of their 
product.”37  As a result of the defendants’ actions, the plaintiff sought five million 
dollars in damages for her injuries, which included the development of “type 2 
                                                          
 30 Goran et al., supra note 29, at 1 (citing Barry M. Popkin & Penny Gordon-Larsen The 
Nutrition Transition: Worldwide Obesity Dynamics and Their Determinants, 28 INT’L J. 
OBESITY & RELATED METABOLIC DISORDERS S1, S2–S9 (3 Supp. 2004); but see Rippe & 
Angelopoulos, supra note 29, at 242 (noting epidemics of diabetes and obesity in countries 
where little or no HFCS is available, such as Mexico, Australia, and Europe). 
 31 Goran et al., supra note 29, at 1. 
 32 Id.  Research conducted by Bray et al. showed that the increase in the consumption of 
HFCS preceded the rapid increase in obesity prevalence.  Bray et al., supra note 23, at 542.  
Similarly, the concurrent rise of HFCS in the nation’s food supply and rates of obesity have 
led to the notion that consumption of HFCS sweetened soft drinks caused or contributed to 
childhood obesity.  R.E. Morgan, Does Consumption of High-Fructose Corn Syrup Beverages 
Cause Obesity in Children?, 8 PEDIATRIC OBESITY 249, 249–50 (2013).  However, a literature 
review of the available research investigating this specific relationship concluded that the 
causal mechanism behind childhood obesity is complex and therefore, increased rates of 
obesity should not be solely attributed to consumption of HFCS beverages.  Id. at 252. 
 33 Goran et al., supra note 29, at 5.  Using data on food availability for forty-three 
countries, researchers compared diabetes estimates between countries that were HFCS users 
and those that were non-users, adjusting for country-based estimates of body mass index (an 
indicator of obesity).  Id. at 3.  The study revealed that all indicators for diabetes were higher 
in countries that used HFCS than those that did not.  Id. 
 34 Complaint at 2, S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 1:13-cv-00634-WMS 
(W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2013). 
 35 See id. at 10–13. 
 36 Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
 37 Id. 
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diabetes, loss of enjoyment of life, pain and suffering, emotional distress . . . and 
lifelong and permanent medical complications[,] including the probability of surgery 
and shortened life expectancy.”38  The court ultimately dismissed plaintiff’s claims, 
noting that she offered “limited facts” to demonstrate that her consumption of foods 
containing HFCS—specifically HFCS manufactured by defendants—“over the 
course of her life[,] was a substantial factor in causing her [disease].”39 
This latest lawsuit is not the first time the food industry has been blamed for 
causing negative health outcomes.40  In Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.,41 two obese 
teenage girls took the fast food giant to court.42  The girls claimed that, as a result of 
                                                          
 38 Id. at 15. 
 39 S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 13-cv-634S, 2014 WL 1600414, at *4 
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2014).  The court observed that the “‘mere possibility of . . . causation is 
not enough.’”  Id. (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971)).  Thus, 
“[i]t may be possible that HFCS caused Plaintiff to develop [t]ype 2 diabetes, but [based upon 
the facts alleged] is it plausible?”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 40 In 2002, Caesar Barber, a fifty-six-year-old man who was 270 pounds and five-foot-ten-
inches tall, brought a class action lawsuit against the fast food giants: McDonald’s 
Corporation, Burger King Corporation, KFC Corporation, and Wendy’s International, Inc.  
Complaint of Caesar Barber v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 23145/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002); see 
also Geraldine Sealey, Obese Man Sues Fast-Food Chains, ABC NEWS, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=91427&page=1 (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).  His 
complaint alleged that the fast food manufacturer’s products, which were high in fat, salt, 
sugar, and cholesterol, contributed to his obesity.  Complaint, Barber, No. 23145/2002, at 9–
10.  Moreover, Mr. Barber claimed the defendants did not disclose the ingredients of their 
food or adequately warn consumers that ingestion of its products are known to cause “obesity, 
diabetes, coronary heart disease, high blood pressure, elevated cholesterol intake, [and] related 
cancers . . . ”  Id. (“Barber’s lawsuit is the first broad-based action taken against the fast food 
industry for allegedly contributing to obesity. [Barber] claims the fast food restaurants, where 
[he] says he used to eat four or five times a week even after suffering a heart attack, did not 
properly disclose the ingredients of their food and the risks of eating too much.”).  Mr. 
Barber’s attorney ultimately withdrew the case to pursue the potentially “ground-breaking” 
case, Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.  Saul Wilensky & Kerry C. O’Dell, Where’s the Beef?–
The Challenges of Obesity Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG LAW, 
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/wheres-the-beef-the-challenges-of-
obesity-lawsuits/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“Barber’s attorney withdrew the case to pursue 
Pelman v. McDonald’s Corporation, a class action with greater potential since, arguably, 
child plaintiff’s would not be accountable for their choices of food.  Pelman was expected to 
be ground-breaking litigation that would purportedly expose industry documents, which, in 
turn, could be used to bring a flood of litigation against ‘Big Food.’”). 
 41 Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 42 The plaintiffs were fourteen-year-old Ashley Pelman, who was four-feet-ten-inches tall 
and weighed 170 pounds, and nineteen-year-old Jazlyn Bradley, who was five-feet-six-inches 
tall and weighed 270 pounds.  FRANCINE R. KAUFMAN, DIABESITY: THE OBESITY-DIABETES 
EPIDEMIC THAT THREATENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE MUST DO TO STOP IT 218 (2005).  
Using a person’s height and weight, body mass index (BMI) provides an indirect measure of a 
person’s body fat.  About BMI for Adults, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_BMI/.  According to 
BMI categories, persons with BMI greater than 25 are considered overweight and those with a 
BMI over 30 are classified as obese.  Id.  According to her BMI of 35.5, Ashley Pelman was 
considered obese.  Calculate Your Body Mass Index, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/BMI/bmicalc.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).  
 
272 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 28:264 
 
their consumption of McDonald’s fast food products, they became overweight, 
developed diabetes, coronary heart disease, high blood pressure and cholesterol 
levels, and other detrimental health effects.43  
The girls claimed that the food giant engaged in deceptive marketing and selling 
practices that caused them to “injure their health by becoming obese.”44  Their 
complaint alleged that McDonald’s failed to adequately disclose the health effects of 
ingesting certain food items with high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar and 
that it engaged in marketing designed to entice customers to purchase “value meals” 
without disclosing the potential negative health effects of consumption.45   
                                                          
Although obesity means having a BMI greater than or equal to 30, morbid obesity begins at a 
BMI of 40.  Daniel J. DeNoon, Morbid Obesity Bulge Gets Bigger, WEBMD (Apr. 9, 2007), 
http://www.webmd.com/diet/news/20070409/morbid-obesity-bulge-gets-bigger.  Under this 
classification, Jazlyn Bradley, who had a BMI of 43.6, was considered morbidly obese.  Id.  
Jazlyn’s BMI places her “at greater risk for illnesses including diabetes, high blood pressure, 
sleep apnea, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), gallstones, osteoarthritis, heart disease, 
and cancer.”  What is Morbid Obesity?, U.ROCHESTER MED. CTR., 
http://www.urmc.rochester.edu/highland/departments-centers/bariatrics/right-for-you/morbid-
obesity.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
 43 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 519.  Since she was five years old, Ashley had consumed 
Happy Meals and Big Macs three to four times a week.  KAUFMAN, supra note 42, at 218.  
Jazlyn, a more avid consumer, ate at McDonald’s for both breakfast and lunch, and sometimes 
after school.  Id.  Generally, she ordered whole meals each visit, consisting of a Big Mac, 
Chicken McNuggets, or fried fish sandwich, in addition to fries, soda or a dessert.  Id. 
 44 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 516.  The plaintiffs in Pelman were not the last to accuse 
McDonald’s of deceptive practices that violated consumer protection laws.  Ashley Post, 
Class Action Lawsuit Against McDonald’s Attacks Marketing to Children, 
INSIDECOUNSEL.COM. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/03/01/class-action-
lawsuit-against-mcdonalds-attacks-marketing-to-children?t=litigation&page=3.  In December 
2010, a California mother of two, Monet Parham, filed a class action lawsuit against 
McDonald’s Corp., alleging that marketing Happy Meals to children violated consumer 
protection laws.  Id.  According to Parham’s complaint, “McDonald’s exploit[ed] very young . 
. . children and harm[ed] their health by advertising unhealthy Happy Meals with toys directly 
to them.”  Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Unfair Competition Law, 
the Consumers Legal Remedies Act & Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Parham v. 
McDonald’s Corp., No. 10-506178 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Apr. 4, 2014).  
Because young children “do not have the cognitive skills and developmental maturity” to 
comprehend McDonald’s persuasive marketing techniques, its use of toys to “bait” children 
was “inherently deceptive” and violated state law.  Id.  In April 2012, however, Parham’s 
claims were dismissed without leave to amend.  Order Sustaining McDonald’s Demurrers to 
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 2, Parham v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 10-506178 (Cal. 
Super. Ct., San Francisco County Apr. 4, 2014).  Although viewed by some critics as 
frivolous, Parham v. McDonald’s Corp. “reflects a national focus on health, and imminent 
industry wide marketing and product reform.”  Post, supra.   
 45 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 520.  Class action lawsuits for alleged violations of 
consumer protection statutes may be the best approach to encourage the food industry to 
improve the nutritional content of its product and to change its marketing strategies.  Jess 
Alderman & Richard A. Daynard, Applying Lessons from Tobacco Litigation to Obesity 
Lawsuits, 30 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 82, 87 (2006).  This is likely because “[c]onsumer 
protection statutes make it easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate a link between corporate 
behavior . . . and the public’s direct losses . . . because most do not require a showing that the 
defendant’s misbehavior caused a specific illness.”  Id. at 85. A similar approach was 
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Plaintiffs also accused McDonald’s of negligence, arguing that the food giant 
sold food products high in cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar when studies showed that 
consumption of such foods caused obesity and other adverse health consequences.46  
The complaint further alleged that McDonald’s failed to warn customers of the 
nutritional content and specific ingredients of its food products.47  
In dismissing each of the plaintiffs’ claims, the court provided a roadmap for 
future food industry lawsuits.  Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs failed 
to establish that McDonald’s produced a product with dangerous attributes that were 
outside the common knowledge of the reasonable consumer.48  The court 
acknowledged the well-known fact that fast food, particularly McDonald’s fast food 
products, contained high levels of fat, cholesterol, salt, and sugar and that these 
ingredients were deleterious to one’s health.49  As long as consumers knowledgably 
exercise their free choice, manufacturers will not face liability.50  The court found 
that plaintiffs did not allege in their complaint that their choice to eat McDonald’s 
                                                          
successfully used by plaintiffs against tobacco companies.  See Aspinall v. Phillip Morris, Co., 
No. Civ.A. 98-6002, 2006 WL 2971490, at *1 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 9, 2006) (holding that 
Philip Morris engaged in deceptive business practices when it used the descriptors “light” and 
“lowered tar and nicotine” in the marketing of their cigarettes); but see Price v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 54 (Ill. 2005) (overturning $10 billion jury award for plaintiffs by finding 
that Philip Morris’ use of the terms “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” were not a violation 
of the Consumer Fraud Act because their use was specifically authorized by the Federal Trade 
Commission.). 
 46 Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 47 Id.  In a negligent failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the danger was not 
obvious to the average consumer; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended 
use; (3) the plaintiff’s obesity was caused by the food product; and (4) the harm would not 
have occurred if a warning had been given.  Michelle M. Mello, Eric B. Rimm & David M. 
Studdert, The McLawsuit: The Fast-Food Industry and Legal Accountability for Obesity, 22 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 207, 208–09 (2003) (citing Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 540–41); see 
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (1998).  In their amended 
complaint, the plaintiffs in Pelman re-alleged negligence by McDonald’s because of its failure 
to warn plaintiffs of the dangers of eating processed foods from McDonald’s, but dropped this 
cause of action right before oral argument.  Amended Complaint, Pelman v. McDonald’s 
Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821(RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2003); Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. 
McDonald’s Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821(RWS), 2003 WL 22052778, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 
2003) (“Shortly before oral argument . . . plaintiffs informed the Court that they [were] 
dropping their fourth cause of action, which alleged negligence by McDonald’s because of its 
failure to warn plaintiffs of the dangers and adverse health effects of eating processed foods 
from McDonald’s.”). 
 48 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 522.  For a product to be considered unreasonably 
dangerous, “the article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community as to its characteristics.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 
402A cmt. i (1965). 
 49 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 532.   
 50 Id. at 533 (“As long as a consumer exercises free choice with appropriate knowledge, 
liability for negligence will not attach to a manufacturer.  It is only when that free choice 
becomes but a chimera—for instance, by the masking of information necessary to make the 
choice . . . that manufacturers should be held accountable.”). 
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“several times a week [was] anything but a choice freely made” and that their 
decisions could not now be attributed to McDonald’s.51   
Another hurdle that the Pelman plaintiffs faced was establishing that their 
particular health problems were proximately caused by consumption of McDonald’s 
fast food products.52  In order for a plaintiff to prove proximate cause, he or she must 
demonstrate that the defendant’s actions were a substantial factor in bringing about 
the harm.53  The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish proximate cause 
because it is “impossible as a matter of law” to blame a particular fast food 
establishment for causing their obesity when the plaintiffs were possibly consuming 
other unhealthy foods, may or may not have engaged in regular physical activity, and 
when their weights could have been influenced by other genetic or environmental 
factors.54   
In dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of proximate cause, the court 
provided guidance on how future plaintiff could survive a motion to dismiss.  First, a 
complaint “must establish that the plaintiffs ate at McDonald’s on a sufficient 
number of occasions such that a question of fact is raised as to whether McDonald’s 
products played a significant role in the plaintiff’s health problems.”55  Second, in 
order to allege that consumption of McDonald’s products was a substantial factor in 
causing a plaintiff’s health problems, the complaint must eliminate, or at least 
address, the factors, other than diet, that might cause or contribute to obesity and 
other health problems.56  
                                                          
 51 Id.   
 52 Id. at 537. 
 53 Id.  In addition to the substantial factor test, demonstrating that the consumption of fast 
food causes to adverse health effects requires two additional proofs.  Mello et al., supra note 
47, at 209.  First, plaintiffs must establish the association between obesity and specific 
negative health consequences and then, convince the court that if adequate warnings have 
been provided, “the plaintiffs could have avoided the health problems for which they blame 
the manufacturer.”  Id. at 10.  
 54 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 537, n.27.  For additional information on factors 
contributing to obesity, see Obesity Causes, HARVARD SCH. PUB. HEALTH, 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/obesity-prevention-source/obesity-causes/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2015). 
 55 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 538–39. For instance, the larger the number of McDonald’s 
meals consumed, the greater the likelihood that its products were a substantial factor in 
adversely affecting plaintiffs’ health.  Id. at 539.   
 56 Id. (citing Clinical Guidelines on the Identification, Evaluation, and Treatment of 
Overweight and Obesity in Adults, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Sept. 1998), 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob_gdlns.pdf (“Obesity is a complex 
multifactorial chronic disease that develops from an interaction of genotype and the 
environment.  Our understanding of how and why obesity develops is incomplete, but 
involves the integration of social, behavioral, cultural, physiological, metabolic and genetic 
factors.”)).  The federal Food and Drug Administration also acknowledges that “[t]he problem 
of obesity in America has no single cause.  Rather [it] is the result of multiple factors acting 
together over time.” Calories Count: Report of the Working Group on Obesity, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/ConsumerBehaviorResearch/ucm081770.htm
.   
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III.  USING EPIDEMILOGIC EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH CAUSATION IN PRODUCT 
LIABILITY CASES  
 
Generally, causation is established when a plaintiff can demonstrate a nexus 
between a defendant’s wrongful conduct and her injury.57  The traditional “but for” 
test of actual causation, commonly employed by most jurisdictions, “illustrates the 
‘cause and effect’ relationship between an event and a consequence.”58  The test 
recognizes that a defendant’s actions are responsible for a plaintiff’s injuries if the 
harm “would not have occurred in the absence of the defendant’s conduct.”59  
Although the application of the “but for” test resolves most causation issues in tort 
law, the test presumes the existence of only a single causative factor.60   
Direct traceability is difficult to establish, however, when multiple factors may 
have played a role in bringing about a single injury.  To prevent negligent defendants 
from escaping liability by pointing to other potential causes for the plaintiff’s injury, 
courts developed the “substantial factor” test for multiple causation scenarios.61  
Under this test, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant’s actions were a substantial 
factor in bringing about her harm.62  Thus, in order to prevail against HFCS 
manufacturers under a negligence theory, the plaintiff must establish a causal link 
between consumption of the defendant’s products and the development of type 2 
diabetes.  Notably, the plaintiff need not show that her consumption of HFCS was 
the sole cause of her diabetes, only that it played a substantial role in the 
                                                          
 57 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984). 
 58 Danielle Conway-Jones, Factual Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Philosophical 
View of Proof and Certainty in Uncertain Disciplines, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 875, 876 (2002). 
 59 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 186 (2d 
ed. 2011) (“Under the but-for test, the defendant’s conduct is a factual cause of the plaintiff’s 
harm if, but-for the defendant’s conduct, that harm would not have occurred.”). 
 60 Conway-Jones, supra note 58, at 888.  Another problem with the traditional “but for” 
test is that it “can be applied only by comparing what happened with a hypothetical alternative 
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 59, at § 187.  This requires the fact finder to imagine an alternative 
series of events that would have occurred had the defendant not acted negligently.  Id.  Thus, 
the determination of factual cause will be based on speculation “about whether the injury 
really could have been avoided if the defendant had not been negligent.”  Id. 
 61 Conway-Jones, supra note 58, at 889; Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 425 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (“[T]he purpose . . . of the substantial factor test . . . is aimed at alleviating the 
inequities that result when applying the but-for test in a multi-defendant case, not at creating 
such inequities.”). Id.  
 62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). 
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development of her disease.63  To demonstrate causation, a plaintiff usually presents 
epidemiologic evidence “as the basis of an expert’s opinion on causation.”64  
Epidemiology is the “study of the distribution and determinants of health related . 
. . events in specified populations, and the application of this study to control of 
health problems.”65  The goal of epidemiologic research is to quantify the causal 
relationship between a certain exposure and disease.66  A two-step process is often 
followed when evaluating epidemiological evidence.67  First, researchers determine 
whether there is an association between an exposure and a particular outcome by 
conducting studies of group (ecological studies) and individual characteristics 
(cohort and case-control studies).68  Next, if an association is found, researchers 
evaluate whether the observed relationship is a causal one.69   
Epidemiological studies are increasingly used as a method for demonstrating 
risks to population groups from various products or practices.70  This discipline 
                                                          
 63 See id.  The “substantial factor test is not a comparative test in which the jury assesses 
all contributing causes and determines which ones are substantial.”  Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 424.  
Instead, the test is whether each contributing cause, by itself, is a substantial factor in causing 
the injury.  Id. at 424–25 (citing Lipke v. Celotex Corp., 505 N.E.2d 1213, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1987)). 
 64 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 551 (3d ed. 2011) 
(“Judges and juries are regularly presented with epidemiologic evidence as the basis of an 
expert’s opinion on causation.  In the courtroom, epidemiologic research findings are offered 
to establish or dispute whether exposure to an agent caused a harmful effect or disease.”). 
 65 JOHN M. LAST, A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 62 (4th ed. 2001). 
 66 DAVID A. SAVITZ, INTERPRETING EPIDEMIOLOGIC EVIDENCE: STRATEGIES FOR STUDY 
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 9 (2003); see FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 552 
(“Epidemiologic evidence identifies agents that are associated with an increased risk of 
disease in groups of individuals, quantifies the amount of excess disease that is associated 
with an agent, and provides a profile of the type of individual who is likely to contract a 
disease after exposed to an agent.”).  
 67 LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 204 (3d ed. 2004). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.  A demonstrated association between a risk factor and disease is attributed to 
“chance, bias, confounding, and/or causality.”  The Role of Epidemiology in Decision-Making, 
THE ANAPOLIS CENTER (1999), http://www.accp1.org/pdf/EpidemiologyInDecision.pdf.  
Using various study designs, epidemiologists strive to “reduce the influence of the first three 
[factors], leaving cause as the most likely explanation of the demonstrated association.”  Id.  
Even if an association is found, the inability of an investigator to reduce or at least account 
for, the effect of chance, confounding, and bias will deem the study’s results of little value 
towards establishing causation.  Id.   
 70 See In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998) 
(“Epidemiology is the best evidence of causation in the mass torts context.”).  In In re Breast 
Implant Litigation, plaintiffs asserted tort claims of negligence and strict liability against 
various breast implant manufacturers alleging that their silicone breast implants caused 
various autoimmune diseases.  Id. at 1221.  The court noted that, without a controlled 
epidemiologic study, there would be no way to determine whether autoimmune diseases “are 
more common in women with silicone breast implants than women without implants.”  Id. at 
1224.  Thus, these studies were deemed necessary to determine causation.  Id.; Brock v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[S]peculation unconfirmed by 
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attained prominence in toxic tort cases where causation was in dispute because toxic 
tort injuries can remain latent for many years.71   
Indeed, the difficulty of proving causation is a major difference between toxic 
tort and ordinary personal injury cases.72  Whereas a single product or incident 
causes an identifiable harm in personal injury suits, disease resulting from long-term 
exposure to a chemical is not directly observable and may not provide any physical 
evidence of the causative agent.73  Because plaintiffs must offer epidemiologic 
evidence to establish the requisite causal link between an exposure and disease 
outcome, factfinders must understand what the discipline can, and more importantly, 
cannot prove.74 
 
IV. THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO PROVE CAUSATION UNDER DAUBERT AND 
ITS PROGENY  
 
The current standard of admissibility for expert testimony was first outlined in 
the leading case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.75  In Daubert, two 
children alleged that their serious birth defects were caused by their mothers’ 
prenatal ingestion of the anti-nausea drug, Bendectin, marketed by Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Dow).76  Dow’s expert, a physician and epidemiologist, 
                                                          
epidemiologic proof cannot form the basis for causation in a court of law.”).  The infamous 
“tobacco cases” also highlighted the use of epidemiologic evidence to establish causation in 
personal injury lawsuits.  In these cases, plaintiffs attempted to use scientific evidence to 
demonstrate the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. For example, in Pritchard v. 
Liggette & Myers Tobacco Co., the plaintiff introduced several expert witnesses each of 
whom testified that the plaintiff’s lung cancer was caused by smoking.  Pritchard v. Liggett & 
Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 294, 299–300 (3d Cir. 1961).  The appellate court found 
that the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to submit the issue of causation to the jury.  Id. at 
295.  
 71 Steve C. Gold, Revisting Relative Risk Rules: Garza, Blanchard, and the Ever Evolving 
Role of Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Cases, 27 TOXICS LAW REPORTER 49, 49 (2012); 
see Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[E]pidemiology is 
the best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort case.”).  
 72 Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and 
Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 379 (1986). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Michael Dore, A Proposed Standard for Evaluating the Use of Epidemiological 
Evidence in Toxic Tort and other Personal Injury Cases, 28 HOW. L.J. 677, 683 (1985); see, 
e.g., Brock, 874 F.2d at 313 (“We find . . . the lack of conclusive epidemiological proof to be 
fatal to the Brock’s case.  While we do not hold that epidemiologic proof is a necessary 
element in all toxic tort cases, it is certainly a very important element.”).  
 75 Some consider the three U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), as the “trilogy” of cases that reflect the 
current standard on the admissibility of expert testimony.  See generally Margaret A. Berger, 
The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 10, 10–20 (2d ed. 2000).  
 76 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 581. 
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reviewed more than thirty published studies on Bendectin and birth defects, 
containing over 130,000 patients, none of which found that Bendectin was capable 
of causing human malformations.77  Based on these reviews, Dow’s expert 
concluded that maternal ingestion of Bendectin during the first trimester of 
pregnancy was not a risk factor for birth defects.78  
Although not disputing the published findings, the plaintiffs offered the 
testimony of their own expert witnesses, all eight of whom found that Bendectin 
could cause birth defects.79  The witnesses based their conclusions on a combination 
of animal-cell, live-animal, and pharmacological studies, and a reanalysis of 
previously published epidemiological studies.80  In granting Dow’s motion for 
summary judgment, the district court found that the plaintiffs’ reanalysis of 
published epidemiological studies was inadmissible because the reanalysis studies 
had neither been published, nor subject to the peer review process.81    
Upon review of the lower court’s ruling, the Supreme Court in Daubert held that 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 702,82 replaced Frye’s “General 
Acceptance” test in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.83  The Court 
assigned the trial judge the “gatekeeping” role of ensuring that an expert’s testimony 
is relevant and has a solid foundation.84  
Under Rule 702, when expert testimony is offered, a trial judge must make a 
preliminary assessment of whether the methodology underlying the expert’s 
testimony is scientifically valid and whether it would assist the factfinder in 
understanding the matter in issue.85  The Court provided a non-exhaustive list of 
factors to be considered in evaluating the admissibility of expert scientific testimony: 
(1) whether technique or theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory or 
                                                          
 77 Id. at 582. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 583.   
 80 Id. 
 81 Id.  For a novel statistical approach analyzing the Bendectin data, see Jon Todd Powell, 
How to Tell the Truth With Statistics: A New Statistical Approach to Analyzing the Bendectin 
Epidemiological Data in the Aftermath of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 31 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1241, 1291–1311 (Winter 1994). 
 82 Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 states:  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.   
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 
 83 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).  
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 592–93. 
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technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;86 (3) the known or 
potential error rate of the scientific technique; and (4) general acceptance within the 
relevant scientific community.87  
The federal judge’s gatekeeping role in screening scientific evidence was further 
clarified in two subsequent Supreme Court decisions: General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner88 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.89  
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the plaintiff, an electrician, alleged that 
workplace exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls promoted his development of 
small cell lung cancer.90  The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, 
which excluded the four epidemiological studies the plaintiff’s experts relied on 
because they were not a sufficient basis for their opinions.91  The Court noted that 
neither Daubert nor the Federal Rules of Evidence required a trial court to admit an 
expert opinion, which rests solely on the authority of the expert witness and is 
unsupported by the epidemiological data.92  Thus, “too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered,” warrants exclusion of expert opinion 
evidence.93 
Later, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court extended Daubert’s 
“gatekeeping obligation” to all expert testimony and concluded that Daubert’s 
reliability inquiry is a flexible one.94  Therefore, instead of using Daubert’s factors 
                                                          
 86 Although peer review and publication is an essential component of the research process, 
it does not automatically attest to a study’s reliability. The Role of Epidemiology in Decision-
Making, supra note 69, at 18–19; see also Brief for Kenneth Rothman et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-
102), 1992 WL 12006438, at *3 (arguing that (1) statistical significance is not necessary as a 
requirement for drawing causal inferences from epidemiologic data; (2) by focusing on such 
inappropriate criteria, a court forecloses testimony about inferences that can be drawn from a 
combination of studies with statistically insignificant results; and (3) by suggesting an expert’s 
“reanalysis” of published data is suspect unless published, a court “fundamentally 
misconstrues how epidemiologists in the real world of science function on a daily basis”).  
Publication deadlines often cause the review to be performed by someone less qualified in the 
investigator’s own field and the sheer number of scientific journals increases the likelihood 
that a research paper can get published somewhere.  The Role of Epidemiology in Decision-
Making, supra note 69, at 18–19. 
 87 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
 88 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 89 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 90 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139.  The plaintiff, Robert Joiner, began working as an electrician in 
1973.  Id. at 193.  His job required him to work with and around dielectric fluid, later 
determined to be contaminated with polycholorinated biphenyls (PCBs).  Id.  “PCB’s are 
widely known to be hazardous to human health” and were banned by Congress in 1978.  Id. 
 91 Id. at 147–48. 
 92 Id. at 146 (“But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a 
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert”). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141, 150.  
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as a definitive “checklist,” a trial judge must consider the specific circumstances and 
issues of each case to determine the appropriate standard of admissibility.95   
The following subparts examine how Daubert and its progeny have been 
interpreted to create a higher threshold for the admission of epidemiologic evidence, 
and how this poses a problem for plaintiffs attempting to prove causation in product 
liability cases. 
 
A. Texas’s Strict Criteria for Determining Scientific Reliability  
 
Various courts since Daubert have construed the Court’s ruling as placing 
stringent standards on the scientific reliability of epidemiologic evidence required to 
support a finding of causation.96  The Texas Supreme Court adopted the strictest of 
these interpretations in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner.97  In another 
case alleging that maternal ingestion of the anti-nausea drug, Bendectin, caused birth 
defects, Texas’s highest court grappled with the issue of whether the plaintiff’s 
causation evidence was scientifically reliable.98  Here, the court held that if an 
expert’s testimony is unreliable, then the testimony itself is not evidence.99  
Further, in determining the scientific reliability of expert testimony, a court must 
look beyond the expert’s bare opinion.100  In this regard, the Havner court 
differentiated between the admissibility of scientific evidence and its legal 
sufficiency in support of a finding of causation.  The court declared that Rule 702 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence dictates whether an expert’s opinion is admissible to 
support a finding of causation and offers “substantive guidelines in determining if 
                                                          
 95 Id; Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for 
Medical Testimony, 288 JAMA 1382, 1383 (2002).  For a discussion of the Daubert trilogy 
and why its admissibility standards necessitate the appointment of forensic exerts in criminal 
cases, see Laurel Gilbert, Sharpening the Tools of an Adequate Defense: Providing for the 
Appointment of Experts for Indigent Defendants in Child Death Cases Under Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 469 (2013). 
 96 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 561; see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, 347 
S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2011); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717 (Tex. 
1997); Estate of George v. Vermont League of Cities and Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 378 (Vt. 
2010) (finding “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering a relative risk 
greater than 2.0 as a reasonable and helpful benchmark . . . .”); Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) (“For an epidemiological study to show 
causation under a preponderance standard, ‘the relative risk of limb reduction defects arising 
from the epidemiological data . . . will, at a minimum, have to exceed ‘2.’”) (citing DeLuca v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990)); Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & 
Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (dismissing scientific expert’s 
probability estimate because it was not founded upon epidemiologic studies demonstrating a 
relative risk value greater than 2.0). 
 97 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 706 (Tex. 1997). 
 98 Id. at 711. 
 99 Id. at 714.  “A flaw in the expert’s reasoning from the [epidemiologic] data may render 
reliance on a study unreasonable and render the inferences drawn therefrom dubious.  Under 
that circumstance, the expert’s scientific testimony is unreliable and, legally, no evidence.” Id. 
 100 Id. at 711–12. 
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the expert testimony is some evidence of probative value.”101  Thus, if a claimant’s 
evidence is deemed admissible, a court should then evaluate whether it is legally 
sufficient to support a finding of causation based on the totality of the claimant’s 
available evidence.102  
In order to be legally sufficient, a litigant must offer epidemiologic studies that 
not only show a “substantially elevated risk” of disease, but must also demonstrate 
that they are similar to the study’s participants.103  Moreover, if there are alternative 
causes of the disease, the litigant must introduce evidence negating those causes.104  
Further, in rejecting the reliability of the Havners’ epidemiologic evidence, the 
Texas Supreme Court established several guidelines in considering its legal 
sufficiency: (1) each epidemiologic study relied upon must report a statistically 
significant relative risk105 of at least 2.0;106 (2) each study must be published or 
otherwise subjected to the peer review process; (3) the study must not have been 
prepared for litigation purposes; and (4) the claimant must provide at least two 
properly designed epidemiologic studies that meet the above mentioned criteria.107  
The surprising premise behind Havner’s stringent requirements was the notion 
that any study that did not find a statistically significant relative risk greater than 2.0 
                                                          
 101 Id.  These guidelines included: (1) the extent to which the theory has been tested; (2) the 
extent to which the technique depends upon subjective interpretation; (3) whether the theory 
has been subjected to peer review; (4) the technique’s rate of error; (5) whether the theory or 
technique is generally accepted as valid by the scientific community; and (6) the technique’s 
non-judicial uses.  Id. at 712 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 
549, 557 (Tex. 1995)). 
 102 Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Relative risk is an epidemiologic measure of association, which compares the rate of 
disease development among a group of individuals that were exposed to a particular risk 
factor and a group of individuals that were not exposed.  See ANTONY STEWART, BASIC 
STATISTICS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 113 (3d ed. 2010).  Relative risk is 
calculated by dividing the disease occurrence in the exposed group by the disease occurrence 
in the non-exposed group.  Id.  If the relative risk value is greater than 1.0, then there is an 
increased risk of developing disease if one is exposed to the risk factor.  Id. 
 106 Recognizing the difficulty in equating scientific measures of association with legal 
standards, the court in Havner nevertheless ruled that only properly designed and executed 
epidemiologic studies finding that exposure more than doubled the risk of injury could be 
used to support a finding of causation in toxic tort cases.  Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. 
Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 17 (Tex. 1997).  The court explained, however, that a relative risk 
greater than 2.0 is not a “litmus test,” and that a single epidemiologic study is legally 
insufficient to prove causation.  Id. at 718.  Indeed, the court acknowledged that a study may 
have a high relative risk even in the absence of a causal relationship.  Id.  
 107 See id. at 725–27. 
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was unreliable.108  Thus, an expert’s opinion that relied on that study was also 
unreliable and inadmissible as evidence to prove causation.109  
 
B. The Problems with a Judge-Made Threshold for Admissibility of Epidemiologic 
Evidence 
  
Findings of liability in the context of toxic torts are rare because the judicial 
system has erected seemingly insurmountable procedural and substantive barriers to 
bring a claim, the most daunting of which is proving causation.110  Judicially created 
tests for the admissibility of epidemiologic evidence, such as the one developed by 
the Texas Supreme Court in Havner, place an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs and 
frequently result in the dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims.111  
                                                          
 108 See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Tex. 2011) (explaining the 
court’s Havner holding). 
 109 See id.; see also Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714 (“If the foundational data underlying the 
opinion testimony are unreliable, an expert will not be permitted to base an opinion on that 
data because any opinion drawn from that data is likewise unreliable.”).  Later, in Merck & 
Co. v. Garza, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the Havner’s requirements for determining 
whether epidemiological evidence is scientifically reliable to prove causation.  Garza, 347 
S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2011).  Leonel Garza, plaintiffs’ decedent, had a long history of heart 
disease and was prescribed Vioxx, an anti-inflammatory drug, marketed by the defendant, 
Merck & Co. as a pain reliever.  Id.  Mr. Garza ingested 25 mg Vioxx a day for twenty-five 
days until his death.  Id.  In a products liability lawsuit against Merck & Co., plaintiffs 
introduced clinical trial studies showing an increased risk of cardiovascular disease as proof 
that Vioxx caused Mr. Garza’s death.  See id. at 259, 262.  Although the court acknowledged 
the increased reliability of clinical trials, as opposed to observational epidemiological studies, 
it concluded that both types of studies must report a “statistically significant doubling of the 
risk” in order to meet the more likely than not standard of proof.  Id. at 263.  The Texas 
Supreme Court opted not to follow the holdings of other courts that had determined 
epidemiologic studies with a relative risk less than 2.0 could suffice if supplemented with 
other evidence of causation.  Id. at 265 (citing Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 715).  Other courts 
favor a more flexible Daubert inquiry over bright-line rules and view a relative risk (or odds 
ratio) value of 2.0 as one factor among many that the court can consider in determining the 
reliability of an expert’s opinion.  See, e.g., Pritchard v. Dow Agro Sciences, 705 F. Supp. 2d 
471, 486 (W.D. Pa. 2010); see also Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. 
Supp. 2d 584, 606 (D.N.J. 2002) (“[A] relative risk of 2.0 is not so much a password to a 
finding of causation as one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to consider in 
determining whether an expert has employed a sound methodology in reaching his or her 
conclusion.”) (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079. 1087 (N.J. 1992)). 
 110 Conway-Jones, supra note 58, at 876.  
 111 Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 
cmt. c(1) (2010) (advising that courts should be cautious about adopting certain scientific 
principles, taken out of context, in order to formulate bright-line legal rules because scientific 
standards for the sufficiency of evidence to establish a proposition may not be appropriate for 
the law and because causal inferences require judgment and interpretation); see also FAULT 
LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 273 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 
2009) (“Plaintiffs can’t achieve epidemiological studies by themselves, epidemiology is not 
the be all and end all of causal inquiry, and the courts–by and large–have turned their 
‘gatekeeping’ function into more of a ‘search and destroy’ mission.”); Kassirer & Cecil, supra 
note 95, at 1382 (“[C]ourts appear to be asserting standards that they attribute to the medical 
 
2015] THE NOT SO “SWEET SURPRISE” 283 
 
By equating a relative risk of 2.0 as meeting the more likely than not burden of 
proof in civil cases,112 courts mistakenly believe that a relative risk value greater than 
2.0 is sufficient evidence for a finding of specific causation.113  Consistent with the 
decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, some courts have deemed as inadmissible 
any epidemiologic evidence that does not show at least a statistically significant 
doubling of the risk.114   
Commentators have also noted that courts are increasingly ignoring other 
scientific evidence (such as animal studies, differential diagnoses, and chemical 
structure comparisons) and over-emphasizing epidemiological evidence that 
demonstrates a risk ratio greater than 2.0.115  There is an inherent problem in relying 
too heavily on a bright-line quantitative threshold for admissibility because statistical 
methods alone cannot establish proof of causation.  While the concept of “doubling 
the risk” appears reasonable, some epidemiologists note that it does not represent a 
more likely than not probability that an exposure will cause disease.116  This is 
because the “causal significance of an association is a matter of judgment which 
goes beyond any statement of statistical probability.”117  Indeed, the fundamental 
problem of relying on epidemiologic evidence alone is that causal inferences can be 
drawn from such studies only when coupled with additional data.118  
By ignoring scientific evidence that does not meet an arbitrary quantitative 
standard, courts deprive juries of the opportunity to aggregate multiple pieces of 
                                                          
profession, but that are inconsistent and sometimes more demanding than actual medical 
practice.  As a result, plaintiffs seeking compensation for an illness attributed to a toxic 
exposure lose the opportunity to present their evidence to a jury.”). 
 112 See Vern R. Walker, Restoring the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by Rejecting “Junk 
Logic” About Specific Causation, 56 ALA. L. REV. 381, 473 n. 320 (2004) (“A relative risk 
greater than ‘2’ means that the disease more likely than not was caused by the event.”). 
 113 Id. at 468.   
 114 In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224–26 (D. Colo. 1998) (finding that 
if epidemiologic evidence did not show that breast implants doubled the risk of disease, then 
plaintiff’s causation evidence was inadmissible); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. 
Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 
740, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (declaring that plaintiffs must prove at least a two-fold increase in 
the incidence of disease allegedly caused by exposure to toxic substance).  The court in In re 
Breast Implant Litigation, noted that of at least seventeen epidemiological studies of breast 
implants published in peer-reviewed medical journals, none consistently showed a significant 
elevation of risk over 2.0.  In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.  Therefore, the 
court concluded that breast implants did not cause any of the diseases that plaintiffs alleged.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 115 David Egilman, Joyce Kim & Molly Biklen, Proving Causation: The Use and Abuse of 
Medical and Scientific Evidence Inside the Courtroom—An Epidemiologist’s Critique of the 
Judicial Interpretation of the Daubert Ruling, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 223, 224 (2003). 
 116 Id. at 229. 
 117 Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the 
Public Health Service, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE 20 (1984), 
available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBMQ.pdf. 
 118 Id.  
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evidence in determining causation.119  Taking advantage of the stringent causation 
hurdles faced by plaintiffs, product manufacturers have urged courts to evaluate each 
type of study (animal, epidemiological, pathological, clinical, etc.) independently 
from other forms of evidence, thus attacking the very means of proving causation.120  
 
V. AN EPIDEMIOLOGIC STUDY SHOULD BE EVALUATED ON THE BASIS OF ITS DESIGN, 
CONDUCT, AND ANALYSIS. 
 
Judicially created admissibility tests should be substituted with a comprehensive 
approach that mirrors how practitioners derive causal inferences in the field.121  This 
Comment suggests that instead of relying on arbitrary cut-offs for determining the 
admissibility of epidemiologic evidence, judges should evaluate the validity122 of an 
epidemiologic study on the basis of its design, conduct, and analysis.123  In doing so, 
it further proposes, as a rubric for assessing study validity, a series of questions that 
                                                          
 119 See Egilman et al., supra note 115, at 224. 
 120 Id. at 231; see Kassirer & Cecil, supra note 95, at 1383–84 (“[A]ssessment of evidence 
and causal inferences depend on accumulating all potentially relevant evidence and making a 
subjective judgment about the strength of the evidence.”). 
 121 For example, physicians practicing the doctrine of evidence-based medicine use a 
“current best evidence” approach when making decisions about individual patient care.  Sean 
C. Grondin & Colin Schieman, Evidence-Based Medicine: Levels of Evidence and Evaluation 
Systems, Difficult Decisions, in THORACIC SURGERY 13 (M.K. Ferguson ed., 2011).  A tenet of 
evidence-based medicine is that a hierarchy of evidence exists based upon the soundness of 
the study’s methodology and the subsequent strength of any inferences drawn from it.  Id.  
Evidence-based medicine recognizes that various forms of evidence may each provide 
appropriate clinical recommendations, but that some forms are more reliable than others.  Id. 
at 14.  Consequently, a hierarchy of the strength of evidence has been used to guide clinical 
decision making.  Id.  
 122 Assessing the validity of epidemiological studies amounts to evaluating whether the 
causal inferences drawn from such studies are warranted.  Julia H. Zaccai, How to Assess 
Epidemiological Studies, 80 POSTGRAD MED. J. 140, 140 (2004). 
 123 Id.; The Role of Epidemiology in Decision-Making, supra note 69, at 21; NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, HEALTH RISKS FROM EXPOSURE TO LOW 
LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR VII PHASE 2 139 (2006) (“The first step in the 
interpretation of data is to assess the methods used in the study itself.”); Kassirer & Cecil, 
supra note 95, at 1383 (“[E]very [epidemiologic] study must be scrutinized not only for . . . 
confounders, but for the defects in study design, data quality, and the strength of the statistical 
correlation.”).  A similar approach for summarizing epidemiologic evidence in order to derive 
a causal assessment is termed the “weight of the evidence approach.”  Ronald H. White, et al., 
Workshop Report: Evaluation of Epidemiological Data Consistency for Application in 
Regulatory Risk Assessment, 6 OPEN EPIDEMIOLOGY J. 1, 6 (2013).  This approach takes into 
account the results of all available studies and assigns “greater ‘weight’ to those considered to 
have the greatest reliability and validity.”  Id.  The approach advocated in this Comment, 
however, proposes that only validly conducted epidemiologic studies should be used as a basis 
from which experts can draw any causal inferences.  Another approach to weighing 
epidemiologic evidence recommends that justifiable criteria must include “outcome 
ascertainment, exposure measures, and other sources of bias,” rather than set rules designed to 
assess study quality. Id.  
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fact finders should ask of each epidemiologic study offered into evidence.124  If a 
study is deemed valid under these criteria, then experts may rely on its findings in 
drawing causal inferences.  This Comment also examines how these guidelines can 
be used to assess the validity of epidemiological studies investigating dietary 
exposures, particularly the link between HFCS consumption and type 2 diabetes.   
 
A. Assessing the Validity of an Epidemiologic Study. 
  
There are many potential reasons for why a study’s reported measure of 
association (i.e. relative risk, odds ratio, or risk ratio) does not accurately quantify 
the true causal relationship between exposure and disease.  Two of the most 
important concepts to consider in evaluating the validity of a study’s results are 
confounding and bias.125  Because chronic disease epidemiology generally utilizes 
observational methods to detect associations between exposure and disease, 
uncertainty exists in understanding the causes of various chronic conditions, such as 
diabetes.126  Errors in measurement or research design can produce misleading 
results; therefore, considerable expertise is needed to assess the quality of a study’s 
methodology and the validity of its purported findings.127  A fact finder must 
evaluate epidemiologic evidence and the causal inferences derived from them in 
light of these factors. 
1. Did Researchers Attempt to Minimize Confounding?128 
When an association is observed between a risk factor and disease, 
epidemiologists must differentiate whether this association is causal or the result of 
confounding by a third factor.129   
                                                          
 124 The following series of questions designed to assess study validity borrow from the 
ideas of Julia H. Zaccai, as described in her article, “How to Assess Epidemiological Studies.”  
Zaccai, supra note 122, at 143–44. 
 125 E.g., CHRONIC DISEASE EPIDEMIOLOGY AND CONTROL 43 (Patrick L. Remington, Ross 
C. Brownson & Mark V. Wegner, eds., 3d ed. 2010).  
 126 See id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, supra note 123, at 139 
(recommending that readers consider whether there is evidence that the study addressed the 
potential confounding influences of other factors).  
 129 GORDIS, supra note 67, at 228.  In Schwab v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., the court 
examined the failure of early epidemiological studies exploring the association between lung 
cancer and low tar cigarettes to account for confounding variables.  449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 
1199–1200 (E.D.N.Y), rev’d on other grounds 552 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008).  Early 
epidemiologic studies concluded that reduced tar cigarettes were safer than their higher tar or 
“full flavor” counterparts.  Id.  However, these studies did not consider the possibility that 
people who smoked low tar cigarettes were also more likely to have healthier diets, exercise 
more, or better protect themselves from hazardous occupational exposures, than smokers of 
higher tar cigarettes.  Id.  Thus, the health consciousness of low tar cigarette smokers was a 
potential confounding variable because their healthier lifestyle, rather than their use of low tar 
cigarettes, could have accounted for their lower incidence of lung cancer.  Id.   
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Confounding is a distortion of the estimated effect of an exposure on an outcome 
due to the presence of an extraneous factor that is associated with both the outcome 
and the exposure.130  A confounding variable is both: (1) a known independent risk 
factor for the study disease; and (2) simultaneously associated with the exposure in 
question, but not a consequence of exposure.131   
Confounding is a major source of error in nutritional epidemiology because it is 
difficult to distinguish between diet and other life style factors that contribute to 
obesity and its associated health consequences, such as type 2 diabetes.  The 
distortion caused by a confounding variable can be so large as to mask the true effect 
of the exposure on the disease.132  Therefore, readers of epidemiologic studies must 
assess the possible role that confounding may have played in the study by 
considering whether any important lifestyle factors have been taken into account in 
the design and analysis phase of the study.133  If a study fails to control for 
confounding variables, any reported findings should be viewed with skepticism. 
2. Were There Any Biases that Affected the Study’s Validity? 
Inherent within each epidemiological study is the potential for bias, which is 
“any systematic error in the design, conduct, or analysis of a study that results in a 
mistaken estimate of the exposure’s effect on the risk of disease.”134  Bias in an 
epidemiologic study can distort the true association between exposure and disease 
and affects the reliability of the study’s results.135  Although researchers can attempt 
to minimize bias by carefully planning their study’s design and analysis, it is 
impossible to eliminate completely.   
The presence of bias, however, does not automatically mean that the study’s 
results should be rejected.  Instead, each bias should be individually identified and 
addressed before a study’s results can be used as evidence of a causal relationship.  
Epidemiologic studies investigating the role of nutrition in the development of 
chronic disease are prone to two types of biases: selection and recall bias. 
                                                          
 130 LAST, supra note, 65 at 37.  A common example of confounding is illustrated in the 
relationship between coffee drinking and pancreatic cancer.  GORDIS, supra note 67, at 228.  
In this case, smoking is the confounding variable because (1) it is a known risk factor for 
pancreatic cancer; and (2) is concurrently associated with coffee drinking, but is not a result of 
it.  Id.  Thus, the apparent association between coffee consumption and pancreatic cancer 
could be either that coffee drinking actually causes pancreatic cancer or that individuals who 
drink coffee are also more likely to smoke cigarettes, a recognized risk factor for cancer.  Id. 
 131 GORDIS, supra note 67, at 228; JAMES J. SCHLESSELMAN, CASE-CONTROL STUDIES: 
DESIGN, CONDUCT, AND ANALYSIS 58 (1982) (“A confounder’s association with the study 
disease may be either cause-and-effect or a noncausal relation resulting from the confounder’s 
association with causal factors other than the study exposure.”). 
 132 Zaccai, supra note 122, at 141 (“The distortion introduced by a confounding factor can 
be large and it can lead to overestimation or underestimation of an effect . . . .”). 
 133 Id.  
 134 SCHLESSELMAN, supra note 131, at 124. 
 135 Zaccai, supra note 122, at 140. 
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a. Did Subject Recruitment Methods Minimize Selection Bias?136 
Ideally, investigators want study groups to be comparable on every possible 
variable besides the exposure of interest.  Unfortunately, the procedures used to 
select subjects and the factors that influence study participation are potential sources 
of error that can distort a study’s findings.137  Selection bias is error due to 
systematic differences in characteristics between subjects and non-subjects.138  
In nutritional studies, selection bias occurs when a study’s recruitment methods 
systematically exclude or over-represent certain types of subjects, such that the 
study’s results are not generalizable to the overall population. 139  Therefore, in a 
case-control study140 investigating type 2 diabetes and past HFCS exposure, cases 
and controls should be selected independently of their likelihood to have consumed 
HFCS in the past.141  Similarly, in a cohort study142 examining HFCS consumption 
and future development of type 2 diabetes, exposed and nonexposed subjects should 
be chosen independently of their risk for developing diabetes.143   
                                                          
 136 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, supra note 123, at 139 
(suggesting that one of the first steps in the interpretation of data is to consider whether there 
is evidence that selection bias has been avoided in enrolling the study subjects). 
 137 KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, SANDER GREENLAND & TIMOTHY L. LASH, MODERN 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 134 (3d ed. 2008).  Dr. Ann McKee, a leading researcher of the long-term 
consequences of repetitive brain trauma and its role in the development of chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy (CTE) among football players, addressed the possibility of selection bias in 
her autopsy sample of deceased football players.  Frontline: A League of Denial (PBS 
television broadcast Oct. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/league-of-denial/.  She described selection bias as 
the greater likelihood of families of a player who they suspect is affected by CTE to donate 
their brain to CTE research than a family of a player with no symptoms at all. Id. 
 138 Zaccai, supra note 122, at 140; LAST, supra note 65, at 166.  In the case of In re “Agent 
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., the court discussed selection bias in the context of a cohort study 
consisting of young, healthy men who served in Vietnam.  In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).  The court 
found that comparing the mortality rate of the cohort and that of a control group comprised of 
civilians made it difficult to obtain useful data.  Id.  The young males in the cohort “were a 
highly selected, healthy group so that the expected mortality was relatively slight in their early 
ages and a comparison with base civilian populations difficult.”  Id. 
 139  For example, 24-hour recall interviews that are only conducted in English would 
necessarily exclude from participation, non-English speaking individuals.  
 140 See infra note 173. 
 141 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 584. 
 142 See infra note 170. 
 143 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR, supra note 64, at 584. 
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b. If Performing a Case-Control Study, Did Researchers Adopt Measures to Prevent 
Recall Bias?  
Recall bias occurs when there is a difference, among cases and controls, in being 
able to accurately recall past events or experiences.144  The potential for recall bias to 
distort a measure of association is a major concern in case-control studies, 
particularly when the exposure involves nutrient intake.145  Diagnosis can affect 
subject reporting by improving memory or provoking false memories of exposure.146  
For instance, diseased subjects are more likely able to remember what foods and 
beverages they consumed and may, in their search for the cause, overemphasize the 
role of diet in their disease.147   
Additionally, whereas cohort studies measure diet before the onset of disease, 
case-control studies obtain exposure information after diagnosis has occurred.  Cases 
are thus, more likely to recollect their prior exposures differently from controls 
because they are more motivated to participate in the study and determine the cause 
of their disease.148   
Epidemiologists use measures of association to derive causal inferences, 
however, the reliability of those inferences must be considered by evaluating 
whether the potential biases inherent in the study invalidate its results.149  Therefore, 
potential biases and their effect on the estimated measure of association must be 
                                                          
 144 See SCHLESSELMAN, supra note 131, at 135.  A case-control study examines the possible 
relationship between a particular exposure and a disease by first identifying a group of 
individuals with the disease (cases) and a similar group of individuals without the disease 
(controls).  GORDIS, supra note 67, at 159, 161 (“The hallmark of the case-control study is that 
it begins with people with the disease (cases) and compares then to people without the disease 
(controls).”).  The relationship between a single exposure to disease is examined by 
comparing cases and controls in regard to how frequently the exposure is present in each 
group.  Id. at 150.  Using this type of study design, a positive association exists between the 
exposure and disease when the proportion of individuals who were exposed is higher in cases 
than in controls.  Id. at 160. 
 145 See Satu Männistö et al., Diet and the Risk of Breast Cancer in a Case-Control Study: 
Does the Threat of Disease Have an Influence on Recall Bias? 52 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOLOGY 429, 
430 (1999). 
 146 ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 111.  For example, a mother whose child was born 
with a congenital malformation will be more likely to identify events or experiences during 
her pregnancy than a mother of a child born without a birth defect.  See generally Martha M. 
Werler, Barbara R. Pober, Kathryn Nelson & Lewis B. Holms, Reporting Accuracy Among 
Mothers of Malformed and Nonmalformed Infants, 129 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 415 (1989).  
Contrasting recollections between mothers may artificially suggest a relationship between an 
exposure during pregnancy and congenital malformations.  Id. 
 147 Baerbel Bellach & Lenore Kohlmeier, Energy Adjustment Does Not Control for 
Differential Recall Bias in Nutritional Epidemiology, 51 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOLOGY 393, 393 
(1998) (emphasis added). 
 148 See id.  
 149 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR, supra note 64, at 583. 
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identified and weighed to determine whether the bias “exaggerate[d] the real 
association, dilute[d] it, or . . . completely mask[ed] it.”150 
 
B. Evaluating the Study’s Design and Conduct 
1. Was the Chosen Study Design Appropriate to Answer the Research 
Hypothesis?151   
  
In the past, epidemiological inquiries of diet and disease consisted of ecological 
studies, which compared “disease rates in populations with the population per capita 
consumption of specific dietary factors.”152  Although ecologic studies have been 
useful in stimulating research on the link between diet and chronic diseases, their 
primary drawback is the possibility that confounding factors—such as genetic 
predisposition, other dietary determinants of disease, and environmental or lifestyle 
influences—may vary between regions with high and low incidence of disease.153  
Therefore, such correlational studies cannot yield reliable conclusions regarding the 
relationships between dietary factors and disease and should be given the least 
weight when determining causation.154   
                                                          
 150 Id. (“In reviewing the validity of an epidemiologic study, the epidemiologist must 
identify potential biases and analyze the amount or kind of error that might have been induced 
by the bias.”). 
 151 Zaccai, supra note 122, at 141 (“Researchers have a choice of several study designs for 
their investigation and a judgment must be made as to whether their choice is reasonable in 
relation to the question they wish to consider.”).  For a more comprehensive discussion about 
epidemiologic study designs investigating nutritional exposures and disease outcomes, see 
ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 581–86. 
 152 WALTER WILLETT, NUTRITIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 4 (1998).  Such studies are 
advantageous because they reveal large contrasts in international dietary intake, the use of 
average dietary consumption measures offsets changing dietary patterns over time, and large 
population samples are subject to less random error.  Id. at 4–5.  For an example of an 
ecological study investigating the relationship between availability of high fructose corn syrup 
and prevalence of type 2 diabetes, see generally Goran et al., supra note 29, at 1.  
 153 WILLETT, supra note 152, at 4–5.  Another limitation of all ecological studies is the 
potential for what is known as the “ecological fallacy.”  It is “[a]n error in inference due to 
failure to distinguish between different levels of organization.”  LAST, supra note 65, at 56–
57.  Thus, a correlation between variables based on group characteristics may not necessarily 
mean there is a correlation between variables at the individual level.  For example, suppose at 
the population level, researchers found a correlation between quality of drinking water and 
deaths due to heart disease in a certain region, it would be an ecological fallacy to infer that 
consuming low quality drinking necessarily influences an individual’s chance of dying from 
hearth disease.  Id. at 57.  For more discussion of biases in ecologic studies, see Sander 
Greenland & James Robins, Ecologic Studies—Biases, Misconceptions, and 
Counterexamples, 139 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 747–60 (1994). 
 154 See WILLETT, supra note 152, at 5; FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 561 
(“[Ecological] studies may be useful for identifying associations, but they rarely provide 
definitive causal answers.”).  In Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., plaintiff’s expert conducted an 
ecological study assessing the pattern of cancer incidence among residents living near a 
nuclear weapons plant.  Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1095–98 (D. 
Colo. 2006).   Defendants argued that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible because he 
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Case-control155 and cohort studies156 can avoid many of the weaknesses inherent 
in ecological studies because confounding can be neutralized in either the design or 
analysis phases.157  Although case-controls studies are generally easier to perform 
than cohort studies—because of its smaller sample size and lack of follow up—the 
inherent difficulties in being able to recall past food consumption makes the results 
of a case-control study unreliable.158   
Not only do case-control study subjects have to recall what they ate, when they 
ate it, and how much they ate, considering that HFCS concentration differs 
according to product, subjects must also remember the food product’s brand name.  
Additionally, because HFCS is commonly used to sweeten beverages, subjects 
would also have to recollect what they drank, how much, and how often they drank 
it.  The inability of people to accurately remember what they ate and drank on a daily 
basis over an extended period of time introduces systematic error, or recall bias, that 
will inevitably distort any measure of association derived from the study.159   
Cohort studies present a more promising methodology for elucidating a causal 
relationship between HFCS consumption and type 2 diabetes.  One of the most 
                                                          
used an ecologic study as his method of analysis.  Id.  The court noted that such studies were 
useful for establishing associations but provided relatively weak evidence for establishing a 
conclusive causal relationship between a certain exposure and disease.  Id.  The court, 
however, held that this relative weakness as to causation went to the weight to be accorded the 
study rather than its admissibility.  Id. 
 155 A case-control study compares persons with the disease of interest (cases) and persons 
without the disease (controls).  “[T]he past history of exposure to a suspected risk factor is 
compared between ‘cases’ and ‘controls.’”  E.g., LAST, supra note 65, at 22.  A case-control 
study is termed “retrospective” because the study begins after the onset of disease and looks 
backwards in time to investigate exposure to suspected causal factors.  Id.  The measure of 
association derived from a case-control study is termed the odds ratio.  Id.  In this context, the 
odds ratio represents the odds that a person with type 2 diabetes consumed HFCS as opposed 
to a person without type 2 diabetes and thus asks the question: “What are the odds that a case 
was exposed to the study risk factor?”  GORDIS, supra note 67, at 183 (emphasis added); see 
STEWART, supra note 105, at 115 (calculating odds ratio by dividing the odds that subjects 
with disease were exposed to risk factor by the odds that subjects without the disease were 
exposed to the risk factor). 
 156 A cohort study follows a group of healthy individuals who are, have been, or in the 
future may be exposed or not exposed to a postulated risk factor.  E.g., LAST, supra note 65, at 
33–34.  The frequency of the outcome variable is compared between exposed and unexposed 
groups.  Id.  A cohort study is prospective in its design because it follows exposed and 
unexposed individuals forward in time to see who develops the disease outcome.  Id.  If the 
frequency of disease development is higher in exposed persons than in unexposed persons, it 
may suggests causality between the exposure and disease variables.  Id. 
 157 WILLETT, supra note 152, at 6.   
 158 Id. (“[C]onsistently valid results may be difficult to obtain from case-control studies of 
dietary factors and disease because of the inherent potential for methodologic bias.”). 
 159 See Karin B. Michels, Nutritional Epidemiology—Past, Present, Future, 32 INT’L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 486 (2003); see also ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 582; Bellach & 
Kohlmeier, supra note 147, at 398 (“The concern that cases an controls report their energy 
intakes with different degrees of error remains a critical consideration that must be addressed 
through improved measures.”). 
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attractive features of a cohort study design is its ability to directly measure risk of 
disease development.160  Moreover, due to its prospective nature, dietary information 
is collected before the onset of disease and as the study progresses, resulting in more 
accurate dietary assessments.  Because a cohort study is less susceptible to the 
potential sources of bias associated with case-control studies, it provides more 
reliable results from which to draw causal inferences.161  Therefore, among the three 
study designs discussed, the results of a validly conducted cohort study should be 
given the greatest evidentiary weight.    
2. How Were Study Subjects Chosen? 
The composition of a study population determines the generalizability of its 
results.  A study is “generalizable” when its findings can be extrapolated to a target 
population beyond the subjects of the study itself. 162  In order for readers to assess 
the generalizability of a study’s results, researchers must describe the characteristics 
of the study population, including how many and under what circumstances 
participants were excluded from subsequent statistical analysis.163  What was the 
study’s attrition rate?164  Was it so high that the main characteristics of the study and 
control groups changed significantly?165   
A study with a high attrition rate, which reduces its ability to demonstrate an 
association166 and offsets differences in exposure between study groups, should be 
                                                          
 160 Cohort studies, which follow non-diseased exposed and unexposed subjects forward in 
time in order to see whether or not disease develops, is the preferred method to assess risk.  
GORDIS, supra note 67, at 149.  Because the study begins with non-diseased subjects, it can 
establish a temporal relationship between exposure and disease outcome.  Id.  Drawbacks to 
this method include cost, its long follow up period, potential for subject attrition, and 
inapplicability for diseases with low incidence.  Zaccai, supra note 122, at 142. 
 161 WILLETT, supra note 152, at 9.   
 162 LAST, supra note 65, at 184–85.  Public health research attempts to extrapolate findings 
to the general public.  SAVITZ, supra note 66, at 12.  Extrapolation, however, does not occur 
from a single study, rather, findings are generalizable to the larger population when drawn 
from a series of validly conducted studies.  Id. 
 163 See Zaccai, supra note 122, at 143.  Characteristics of study participants include 
baseline health and sociodemographic information such as sex, race, socioeconomic status, 
and age.  Id.  
 164 Attrition occurs when subjects permanently leave the study.  Vicki L. Kristman, 
Michael Manno & Pierre Côté, Methods to Account for Attrition in Longitudinal Data: Do 
They Work?, 20 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 657, 657 (2005).  Because data is no longer collected 
from these subjects, attrition leads to missing exposure, confounder, or outcome data.  Id.  
This loss of data threatens the validity of the study, decreases sample size, and undermines the 
precision of the risk estimate.  Id. 
 
 165 Zaccai, supra note 122, at 143.  These factors are particularly relevant in evaluating 
nutritional cohort studies because of the study’s long follow up and potential for participant 
fatigue due to intensive dietary assessments. 
 166 The ability to demonstrate an association is termed a study’s power.  “The power of a 
study is determined by several factors, including the frequency of the condition under study, 
the magnitude of the effect, the study design, and sample size.”  LAST, supra note 65, at 138. 
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given less weight in the causal assessment because these factors lead to selection 
bias and thus, a spurious estimate of association between variables.167 
3. How Did Researchers Define Exposure and Outcome Measures? 
Measurement bias occurs when researchers do not accurately define how subjects 
will be classified in regards to their exposure and disease status.168  A study’s results 
can be invalidated by simply failing to choose which measurements, whether it is 
exposure, disease, or confounding variable, will be recorded and how.169  A clear 
definition of what constitutes “exposed” or “diseased” must be decided 
beforehand.170  
For example, in a cohort study evaluating the association between HFCS 
consumption and diabetes, researchers must decide what level of HFCS consumption 
qualifies a subject as “exposed” for the purposes of the study.  Due to the ubiquitous 
nature of HFCS in the nation’s food supply, most people have consumed HFCS at 
one time or another.  The relevant question thus becomes, what dosage and 
frequency of HFCS consumption classifies an individual as exposed?  This is an 
important factor to consider when evaluating epidemiological studies because setting 
exposure to HFCS at abnormally high consumption levels would likely overestimate 
the effect of HFCS on health outcomes.171  Findings from such a study should, 
therefore, be cautiously viewed because its results are generalizable only to a 
population that similarly consumes excessive amounts of HFCS-containing foods or 
beverages.   
 4. How was Dietary Intake Measured?172   
In addition to developing an explicit definition of what constitutes “exposed,” 
researchers must also adopt a reliable method for measuring exposure.  A major 
hurdle in the burgeoning field of nutritional epidemiology is that investigations of 
dietary exposures have traditionally focused on the role of individual foods in 
contributing to disease.173  The case of HFCS, however, presents a new challenge for 
researchers because ingredients are not consumed in isolation but, rather, as part of a 
                                                          
 167 See Kristman et al., supra note 164, at 657 (“Attrition leads to selection bias when the 
distribution of confounders and outcome among the exposed and non-exposed subjects is 
dependent on whether they remained in the study.  This bias may lead to spurious risk 
estimates of unpredictable magnitude and direction.”) (citation omitted). 
 168 Zaccai, supra note 122, at 143.   
 169 See id. 
 170 Therefore, the criteria for including and excluding potential study subjects must be 
planned and clearly delineated a priori, accounting for their degree of exposure, pre-existing 
health conditions, relevant demographic characteristics, and disease diagnosis.  Id. 
 171 Conversely, setting exposure to low levels of HFCS consumption would likely 
underestimate or fail to capture the true effect of HFCS on health outcomes.  Id.  
 172 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, supra note 123, at 139 
(proposing that one of the first questions to consider when interpreting epidemiologic data is 
whether there is “evidence that information bias has been minimized in assessing exposure or 
disease”). 
 173 Michels, supra note 159, at 487. 
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complex assortment of various other ingredients, nutrients, and food products based 
upon individual preference.174  Therefore, the single greatest limitation to 
investigating the role of a particular food ingredient in disease development is the 
difficulty of accurately measuring dietary intake.175 
Currently, the most widely used dietary assessment technique is the 24-hour food 
recall, whereby subjects are asked to report their food intake during the previous 
day.176  Food researchers also employ food diaries, which provide “detailed meal-by-
meal recordings of types and quantities of foods and beverages consumed during a 
specified period.”177  The validity of both methods, however, is questionable due to 
inaccurate subject recall, highly variable day-to-day intake of specific foods, and the 
                                                          
 174 Id.  Unlike exposures that are more easily quantifiable—such as cigarettes smoking—an 
individual’s diet “represents an unusually complex set of exposures that are strongly 
intercorrelated.” WILLETT, supra note 152, at 2; ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 586 
(“The foods we consume each day contain literally thousands of specific chemicals, some 
known and well quantified, some characterized only poorly, and others completely 
undescribed and presently unmeasurable.”).  Further compounding the difficulty of studying 
diet is that: 1) nutritional exposures are continuous variables; 2) eating patterns change over 
time; and 3) individuals are generally not aware of the ingredients of the foods that they eat.  
WILLETT, supra note 152, at 2. 
 175 WILLETT, supra note 152, at 3; see DAVID A. KESSLER, THE END OF OVEREATING: 
TAKING CONTROL OF THE INSATIABLE AMERICAN APPETITE 2 (2009) (“Most people do a poor 
job of reporting what they eat, and overweight people are particularly inaccurate reporters.  So 
much of our eating takes place outside our awareness that it’s easy to underestimate how 
much food we actually put into our bodies.”).  The next frontier of nutritional epidemiological 
research will thus, attempt to incorporate complex dietary patterns into less traditional analytic 
models.  Michels, supra note 159, at 487.  Possible statistical models include the use of factor 
analysis, principal component analysis, cluster analysis, and developing diet scores.  Id. 
 176 ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 589.  The 24-hour recall is the assessment method 
of choice for most national nutrition surveys because it requires no training or literacy and 
poses a minimal burden on study subjects.  Id.  The National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey (NHANES) is a national dietary survey “designed to assess the health 
and nutritional status of adults and children in the United States.”  National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey, 2013-2014: Let’s Improve Our Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhanes/nhanes_13_14/2013-
14_overview_brochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).  It collects information on food, 
nutrient, and supplement intake through the use of 24-hour dietary recalls (conducted in 
person by trained interviewers), food frequency questionnaires, survey questionnaires, and 26-
item dietary screener questionnaires (DSQ).  Dietary Screener Questionnaire in the NHANES 
2009-10, NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE (Sept. 3, 2013), 
http://appliedresearch.cancer.gov/studies/nhanes/dietscreen/; Measuring Guides for the 
Dietary Recall Interview, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 20, 2010), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/measuring_guides_dri/measuringguides.htm.  To view a 
sample questionnaire assessing dietary behavior, see Diet Behavior and Nutrition-DBQ, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhanes/nhanes_13_14/DBQ_H.pdf.  The wide variety of 
assessment instruments illustrates the difficulty of accurately capturing dietary intake.  Id.  
 177 ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 589.  This technique should increase the accuracy 
of subject reporting because foods are recorded as they are consumed, however, it also places 
a substantial burden on subjects who must weigh and describe their meals and portion sizes.  
Id. 
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fact that many meals are eaten away from home.178  Despite these inherent 
drawbacks, due to their low cost and ease of administration, the 24-hour recall and 
food diary will continue to be utilized until a more accurate real-time dietary 
assessment tool is developed.  Consequently, nutritional epidemiologic studies that 
utilize these methods should not be discounted; instead, readers must interpret the 
study’s findings in light of the limitations of measuring dietary exposures. 
 
C. Is there Evidence of a Causal Relationship using Hill’s Criteria?179 
Finally, demonstrating a strong association between an exposure and disease 
does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship.  The Bradford Hill criteria180 are 
often used as a tool for determining whether an observed association in an 
epidemiologic study reflects a causal association between a risk factor and disease.181  
These criteria are: (1) strength of association;182 (2) consistency;183 (3) temporal 
                                                          
 178 Id. 
 179 E.g., OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH 650–652 (Roger Detels et al. eds., 4th ed. 
2002) (noting that Hill’s criteria is commonly used by epidemiologists to separate causal from 
non-causal explanations). 
 180 The Bradford-Hill Criteria are derived from Sir Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment 
and Disease: Association or Causation? 58 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y OF MED. 295–
99 (1965). 
 181 See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 597–606; Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. 
Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 514-16 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (applying the Bradford-Hill criteria to 
evaluate whether a pharmaceutical drug causes intracerebral hemorrhage); Amorgianos v. 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 147, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Even when an 
appropriately designed study yields evidence of a statistical association between a given 
substance and a given health outcome, epidemiologists generally do not accept such an 
association by itself as proof of a causal relationship between the exposure and outcome.  
Epidemiologists generally look to several additional criteria to determine whether a statistical 
association is indeed causal.  These criteria are sometimes referred to as the Bradford Hill 
criteria . . . .”) (citing ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 44 (William N. Rom 
ed., 3d ed. 1998) and CASARETT & DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 79 
(Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 5th ed. 1996)); Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Navarro, 90 S.W.3d 747, 
753 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (“Dr. Dayal testified that if an epidemiological study finds a 
relationship between an exposure and a disease, you still must apply the Bradford Hill nine-
step criteria.”). 
 
 182 The strength of association is proportional to the magnitude of the estimated risk ratio—
the larger the magnitude the more compelling a finding of causation.  See generally Hill, 
supra note 180, at 296; but see ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 26 (“[A] strong 
association is neither necessary nor sufficient for causality, and . . . weakness is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for absence of causality.”). 
 183 Consistency is whether the association has “been repeatedly observed by different 
persons, in different places, circumstances and times.”  Hill, supra note 180, at 296; see also 
Smoking and Health, supra note 117, at 182 (“[Consistency] implies that diverse methods of 
approach in the study of an association will provide similar conclusions.”). 
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relationship between exposure and disease;184 (4) biological plausibility;185 (5) 
coherence;186 (6) specificity;187 (7) dose-response relationship;188 (8) analogy;189 and 
(9) experimentation.190  Although this list represents relevant characteristics in 
evaluating a study, the author himself warned that such “viewpoints” should not be 
used as a set of rigid guidelines establishing causation.191  Thus, the fulfillment of 
Hill’s criteria is not dispositive.192  Instead, they should be considered additional 
factors in evaluating whether a study’s results supports a causal association between 
a dietary exposure and disease outcome. 
The findings of poorly designed epidemiologic studies are of little value when 
deriving causal inferences.193  Therefore, interpreters of epidemiologic evidence 
should not accept a study’s findings without considering the methodology used to 
                                                          
 184 This factor “refers to the necessity that the cause precede the effect in time.”  ROTHMAN 
ET AL., supra note 137, at 28.  Temporality and statistical association are the only two criteria 
that, although not dispositive, are necessary for drawing causal inferences.  CAUSATION IN 
LAW AND MEDICINE 453 (Ian Frecklton & Danuta Mendelson eds., 2002). 
 185 Plausibility concerns whether there is a biological mechanism for an association.  This 
criterion, however, is dependent upon the current state of scientific knowledge at the time of 
assessment.  See Hill, supra note 180, at 298. 
 186 Coherence implies that the suspected causal relationship should not contradict known 
facts in the natural history and biology of the disease.  Id. (citing Smoking and Health, supra 
note 117, at 185). 
 187 Considered the weakest of all Hill’s viewpoints, “[a]n association is specific when a 
certain exposure is associated with only one disease.”  GORDIS, supra note 67, at 215 
(emphasis added). 
 188 Also referred to as “biological gradient,” this criterion refers to a unidirectional dose-
response relationship, whereby increasing exposure results in increasing disease severity.  
OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 179, at 651.  For example, as the number of 
cigarettes smoked increases so do carcinogen exposure and tissue damage, and thus, greater 
opportunity for cancer formation.  Id.   
 189 “[A]nalogy provides a source of more elaborate hypotheses about the associations under 
study[] the absence of [which] only reflects lack of imagination or experience, not the falsity 
of the hypothesis.”  OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 179, at 652. 
 190 Hill, supra note 180, at 295–99.  Although Hill was unclear about what he meant by 
experimentation, he was likely referring to experimental evidence that was the result of 
removing the suspected causative agent in order to see if disease subsided.  OXFORD 
TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 179, at 651. 
 191 Id. at 299 (“None of my nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or against 
the cause-and-effect hypothesis and none can be required as a sine qua non.”).  
Epidemiologists are also in accord with this view.  See, e.g., ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, 
at 30 (“Other than [the necessity that the cause precede the effect in time] there is no 
necessary or sufficient criterion for determining whether an observed association is causal.”). 
 192 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(1) 
(2010) (“No algorithm exists for applying the Hill guidelines to determine whether an 
association truly reflects a causal relationship or is spurious.  Because the inferential process 
involves assessing multiple unranked factors, some of which may be more or less appropriate 
with regard to a specific causal assessment, judgment is required.”).   
 193 The Role of Epidemiology in Decision-Making, supra note 69, at 18. 
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obtain those results.194  Moreover, arbitrary standards for determining whether 
epidemiologic studies can serve as the basis for causal inferences should not be set 
so high that plaintiffs are barred from using this evidence to prove causation.195  
Indeed, it should be recognized that causal inferences “fall along a continuum of 
interpretation, [where] even . . . methodologically weak studies are fodder for the 
assessment of causality.”196  Valid studies that modestly contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between an exposure and disease outcome should 
be valued and viewed as another component in the comprehensive framework of 
evidence from which to make a causal evaluation.197 
 
VI. CONDUCT-BASED DEFENSES POTENTIALLY LIMIT THE LIABILITY OF HFCS 
MANUFACTURERS  
 
A. Assumption of Risk 
Even if HFCS plaintiffs can establish causation, they must still overcome 
conduct-based defenses, which limit the liability of food manufacturers.  The 
assumption of risk doctrine is an affirmative defense that bars recovery in cases 
where a plaintiff voluntarily assumes a risk of harm from the conduct of the 
defendant.198  A plaintiff, who fully understands the risk of harm and voluntarily 
chooses to consume the food product despite that knowledge, implicitly accepts any 
risks associated with the consumption and is not entitled to recovery.199  Therefore, 
plaintiffs must establish that their decision to eat products containing HFCS was not 
a decision freely made because “as long as a consumer exercises free choice with 
appropriate knowledge, liability for negligence will not attach to the 
manufacturer.”200   
Plaintiffs in S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland, however, claim that the aggressive 
attempts of the Corn Refiners Association, a national trade association of corn 
manufacturers, to undo HFCS’s bad reputation were part of an effort to misrepresent 
and conceal the science and consequences of HFCS ingestion.201  In order for 
plaintiffs to recover for their injuries, they must demonstrate that HFCS 
manufacturers did not adequately inform consumers of the risks associated with 
                                                          
 194 Zaccai, supra note 122, at 141.  
 195 See SAVITZ, supra note 66, at 21. 
 196 Id.  
 197 See id. 
 198 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).  When a plaintiff fully understands 
the risk of harm caused by a food product and nevertheless voluntarily chooses to consume it, 
the plaintiff impliedly accepts the risk and is thus not entitled to any recovery.  Id. at § 496C. 
 199 Id. at § 496C. 
 200 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
 201 Complaint at 10, S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 1:13-cv-634S, 2014 WL 
1600414, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2014), 2013 WL 3070911 at *55. 
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HFCS consumption.202  If consumers were unaware, uninformed, or deliberately 
misled about the risks of HFCS, then their decisions were not freely made and the 
assumption of the risk defense is inapplicable.203  
 
B. Contributory Negligence 
Plaintiffs alleging injury from HFCS consumption may also be barred from 
recovery under the doctrine of contributory negligence.  Similar to the assumption of 
risk doctrine, a person is liable for contributory negligence if he or she knows, or 
should have known, the circumstances from which the danger arose and still 
intentionally exposed himself to the danger.204  In other words, although a food 
manufacturer’s negligence is a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s type 2 diabetes, he 
or she will be completely barred from recovering if his or her own conduct fell 
below the standard of care and proximately caused the same injury.205 
 
                                                          
 202 See John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-Food 
Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 127 (2003). 
 203 Id.  The Corn Refiners Association (CRA), a national trade association of corn 
manufacturers, argues that adverse health consequences, such as obesity, are not caused solely 
by HFCS consumption but by the overconsumption of unhealthy foods.  See generally 
Veronica Louie, Masquerading Behind Words: The Corn Refiners Association’s Push to 
Rename High-Fructose Corn Syrup as “Corn Sugar,” 4 NORTHEASTERN. U. L.J. 293, 302 
(2012).  As support for their contention, they cite to numerous scientific articles that call into 
question claims of the negative effects of HFCS.  Id. at 303.  The CRA ran national 
advertisement campaigns to convince consumers that HFCS was equivalent to regular table 
sugar and in 2010, petitioned the Food and Drug Association to rename HFCS as “corn 
sugar.”  Id. at 293; see Corn Refiners Association, Myth vs. Facts, SWEETSURPRISE.COM, 
http://sweetsurprise.com/hfcs-myths-and-facts (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (“[HFCS] is 
basically the same as sugar–both in terms of composition and in the number of calories they 
contain.  Since [HFCS] and sugar are so similar, the human body absorbs them the same 
way.”).  In 2012, the Food & Drug Administration denied the CRA’s petition to use the term 
“corn sugar” to describe HFCS because the term “would suggest that HFCS is a solid, dried, 
and crystallized sweetener obtained from corn.”  Michael M. Landa, Response to Petition 
from Corn Refiners Association to Authorize “Corn Sugar” as an Alternate Common or Usual 
Name for High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 30, 2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/CFSANFOIAElectroni
cReadingRoom/ucm305226.htm.  However, “HFCS is an aqueous solution sweetener derived 
from corn after enzymatic hydrolysis of cornstarch, followed by enzymatic conversion of 
glucose . . . to fructose.”  Id.  
 
 204 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 466 cmt. c and d (1965) (recognizing that 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence doctrines overlap when the plaintiff 
voluntarily consents to encounter a known danger arising from the defendant’s negligent act). 
 205 1 J. LEE & BARRY LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 10:1 (2d 
ed. 2013); Schmidt v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 515 N.W.2d 756, 792 (Neb. 1994) 
(“Contributory negligence is conduct for which the plaintiff is responsible, amounting to a 
breach of the duty imposed upon persons to protect themselves from injury, and which, 
concurring with actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, is a proximate cause of 
injury.”). 
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C. Comparative Responsibility 
In products liability actions, most jurisdictions apply the doctrine of comparative 
responsibility.206  Unlike assumption of risk and contributory negligence, 
comparative responsibility reduces the plaintiff’s recovery in proportion to his or her 
degree of fault.207   Some jurisdictions have adopted a “pure” version of comparative 
fault that “allocates responsibility to each actor . . . in proportion to the actor’s 
percentage of total fault.”208   
In order to prevail under this defense, a HFCS manufacturer must demonstrate 
that the plaintiff acted unreasonably by consuming excess amounts of food products 
containing HFCS, when he was aware of its potential negative health effects.209  
Specifically, that a reasonable person would have learned of the dangers of 
overconsumption and modified his eating habits to reduce his risk for harm.210    
Consumers, however, could argue that because they were unaware of the health 
risks associated with HFCS consumption, they did not voluntarily expose themselves 
to the danger.  Indeed, the Corn Refiners Association’s “Sweet Surprise” marketing 
campaign that attempts to recast HFCS as “corn sugar,” may demonstrate that the 
dangers of HFCS were not within the common knowledge of the average 
consumer.211   
Furthermore, product misuse, a type of consumer behavior, could play a factor in 
apportioning liability.  HFCS manufacturers may argue that overconsumption of 
foods containing HFCS is a misuse of the product and that such overconsumption 
constitutes contributory fault, thereby reducing the plaintiff’s recovery.212  Although 
most consumers are generally aware of the relationship between overeating and 
obesity, the success of these conduct-based affirmative defenses rests on the ability 
of food manufacturers to prove that consumers had specific knowledge of the risk 
that the consumption of HFCS containing products could lead to negative health 
effects, such as diabetes.213  
 
 
                                                          
 206 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 cmt. a (1998). 
 207 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451 (5th ed. 1984). 
 208 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 cmt. b (1998); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 (2000) (“Plaintiff’s negligence . . . that is a 
legal cause of an indivisible injury to the plaintiff reduces the [their] recovery in proportion to 
the share of responsibility the factfinder assigns to the plaintiff . . . .”). 
 209 See Richard C. Ausness, Tell Me What You Eat, and I Will Tell You Whom to Sue: Big 
Problems Ahead for “Big Food”?, 39 GA. L. REV. 839, 882 (2005).   
 210 Id. 
 211 Louie, supra note 203, at 293. 
 212 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 cmt. a (1998).  The plaintiffs in 
Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. advanced this argument. 
 213 See generally Ausness, supra note 209, at 883. 
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VII. APPORTIONING LIABILITY AMONG SEVERAL MANUFACTURERS IS A BARRIER TO 
RECOVERY FOR HFCS PLAINTIFFS 
  
Because HFCS plaintiffs must directly trace their adverse health outcome to 
consuming foods made with the defendant’s product, a major hurdle to recovery will 
be identifying which of several HFCS manufacturers is the actual maker of the 
HFCS that caused their type 2 diabetes.214 Proof of causation, however, is 
particularly difficult when some, but not all, of the HFCS manufactured by the 
defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury.215   
Fortunately, some courts relax the requirement that plaintiffs prove exactly who 
caused their injury by adopting legal doctrines216 that impose collective liability on 
defendants.217  At first glance, the market share liability approach appears to be a 
potential solution to the inability of plaintiffs to identify which of several defendants 
manufactured the HFCS that caused their diabetes.  This section argues, however, 
that even if plaintiffs can establish a causal relationship between HFCS and type 2 
diabetes, the circumstances that typically warrant a remedy under this doctrine are 
absent in the case of HFCS litigation.  
A. The Market Share Liability Approach  
First utilized by the California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories,218 market share liability allows plaintiffs to recover damages when 
they can identify a group of defendants engaged in the harmful conduct, but cannot 
                                                          
 214 Tracing diabetes to a specific manufacturer’s HFCS is inherently problematic because 
consumers have difficulty remembering what they eat.  Plaintiffs would have to be able to 
recall what specific food items they ate, its brand name, and the quantity of the product they 
consumed.  Additionally, plaintiffs’ dietary recall is influenced by their current diet and 
inherently biased because they are parties to a lawsuit attempting to prove causation.  See id. 
 215 Id. at 870.  
 216 There are several other legal doctrines whereby multiple defendants are held 
collectively liable for causing a plaintiff’s injuries.  One approach that may provide HFCS 
plaintiffs a remedy is the doctrine of “enterprise liability,” which was first enunciated in Hall 
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).  This theory is broadly 
used to mean that losses caused by an enterprise should be borne by it.  Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 928 n. 9 (Cal. 1980) (citing Howard C. Klemme, Enterprise 
Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 158 (1976)).  Another approach for 
assigning collective liability emerged in the case of Summers v. Tice, which imposed the 
burden of identifying the cause of the plaintiff’s injury on multiple defendants.  Summers v. 
Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948); see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 59, at § 1921 (“When the 
plaintiff presents evidence that she suffered a single or indivisible injury at the hands of two or 
more tortfeasors, the burden is on the party who seeks to avoid responsibility for the entire 
damages to prove that magnitude of divisible damages.”). 
 217 See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937 (holding that if defendants could not prove that they did not 
make the DES liability for damages would be apportioned based on market share); Ausness, 
supra note 209, at 870; Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of 
Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 159 (2004). 
 218 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. 
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prove which defendant is responsible for their injury.219  Under this theory, a 
plaintiff who is unable to identify the manufacturer of the particular HFCS that 
caused his or her diabetes can still recover on a proportional basis from each of the 
defendant manufacturers that may have supplied the HFCS.220   
In Sindell, daughters allegedly injured by their mothers’ ingestion of 
diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy brought suit against DES manufacturers 
claiming that the drug caused their vaginal and cervical cancers.221  Prior lawsuits 
seeking to hold DES manufacturers responsible for the product’s carcinogenic 
effects were unsuccessful because plaintiffs could not identify the manufacturer of 
the drug prescribed to their mothers.222  Therefore, the issue confronting the court in 
Sindell was whether a plaintiff, who cannot identify the specific manufacturer of the 
responsible product, may hold a manufacturer of a chemically identical drug liable 
for her injuries.223   
Recognizing that the plaintiffs would be barred from recovery altogether if the 
court rigidly adhered to prior precedent, the court created a remedy for cases of 
creation of fungible goods whose source cannot be traced to a specific 
manufacturer.224  Unless it could demonstrate that it could not have made the DES 
that caused the plaintiff’s injuries, the court apportioned damages among DES 
manufacturers in proportion to its respective market share at the relevant time.225    
                                                          
 219 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. p (2010); 
Rostron, supra note 217, at 158; COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE 24 (Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 
1993) (“By this principle, all those who manufactured the generic product may be held 
responsible for the defect . . .  They are not absolved from liability simply because a particular 
plaintiff cannot identify a particular defendant.”). 
 220 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. p 
(2010).  Market share liability is an extension of the court’s holding in the famous case of 
Summers v. Tice, which held that if a party cannot identify which of two or more joint 
tortfeasors caused a plaintiff’s injury, the burden of proof may shift to the defendant to 
demonstrate that they were not responsible for the harm.  Summers, 199 P.2d at 4. 
 221 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 927–28 (Cal. 1980). 
 222 Id. at 927–28. 
 223 Id. at 925.  DES manufacturers had to utilize a standard chemical formula for DES 
outlined in the United States Pharmacopoeia.  Id. at 933. 
 224 Id. at 936–37.  When a product is fungible, market-share liability is appealing because it 
provides compensatory relief to plaintiffs and deters future tortious conduct by defendants.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. p 
(2010).  “If plaintiffs can demonstrate that the marketing and sale of a product was tortious 
and that the product caused their harm, they have a strong claim for compensation.  Id.  This 
approach also serves as a deterrent because it imposes liability on the manufacturers of 
harmful products, even when a long latency period makes identification of the responsible 
manufacturer impossible.  Id. 
 225 Id. at 937.  For a discussion of a new proportional liability doctrine that addresses the 
legal hurdles to recovery for latent diseases caused by diffused environmental hazards see 
Kenneth S. Abraham, Robert L. Rabin & Paul C. Walker, Enterprise Responsibility for 
Personal Injury: Further Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 333 (1993).  Under this approach, 
“in any case relying on epidemiological proof of causation, proportional liability rules [rather 
than] traditional all-or-nothing liability rules, would apply.”  Id. at 355.  The authors proposed 
that proportional liability rules would apply when epidemiological evidence demonstrates at 
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B. Sindell’s “Fungibility” Requirement As a Barrier to Recovery 
Courts since Sindell, however, have limited the reach of the market share 
approach by confining its applicability to cases where the product in question is 
“fungible,” such that “every unit of the product poses an identical degree of risk.”226  
Because market share liability is premised on the notion that identical products pose 
identical risks of harm, the lack of fungibility of a product is often used to bar 
plaintiffs from recovery.227   
In the case of HFCS litigation, the fungibility requirement articulated under 
Sindell, precludes a court from using market share data to allocate liability among 
manufacturers that do not necessarily produce chemically identical HFCS.  In an 
effort to vary the sweetness of their product, manufacturers began altering the 
fructose content of its HFCS.  There are two types of HFCS currently used in food 
products: HFCS-42 and HFCS-55, each named according to its respective proportion 
of fructose. 228  Hence, HFCS-42 is 42% fructose.229  If a dose-response relationship 
exists between increasing fructose consumption and negative health effects, the risk 
of adverse health outcomes will vary depending upon the specific concentration of 
                                                          
least a twenty percent probability of causation and “damages be proportional to causation up 
the point when the probability is at least eighty percent . . . that the defendant’s action caused 
the injury in question.”  Id.  Consequently, victims who were exposed to an environmental 
hazard need not prove that it was at least 51% likely that their exposure caused their disease.  
Id. at 353.  Rather, if the causal likelihood of exposure, as determined by epidemiological 
studies, was 35%, then victims would be awarded only 35% of their losses.  See id.   
 226 Rostron, supra note 217, at 153. 
 227 Id. at 153–54; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 28 (2010).  
When market-share liability is limited to fungible products that pose equivalent risks 
to users who have no reasonable means to prove which manufacturer provided the 
product that caused the plaintiff’s harm, it has an exceedingly limited reach . . . Only 
products that cause harm after a lengthy latency period between exposure and 
development of harm are likely to create the systemic proof problems that market-
share liability addresses.   
Id.  Additional factors in Sindell that augured in favor of relaxing the traditional 
causation requirements were the egregious actions of DES manufacturers and the 
circumstances of the plaintiffs’ injuries that rendered identification of a specific 
manufacturer impossible by either party.  See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 
P.2d 924, 925–26 (Cal. 1980).  DES Manufacturers knew or should have known of 
the dangers, manufacturers failed to test DES for efficacy and safety, failed to warn 
consumers of potential carcinogenic effects, and marketed DES on an unlimited 
basis without authorization from the Food and Drug Administration.  Id. 
 
 228 Bray et al., supra note 23, at 537 (describing two different types of HFCS—HFCS-42 
(42% fructose) and HFCS-55 (55% fructose)—made by enzymatic isomerization of glucose to 
fructose); see also Corn Refiners Association, What is HFCS?, SWEET SURPRISE, 
http://sweetsurprise.com/what-is-hfcs (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (“[HFCS], a sugar made 
from corn, comes in two compositions–HFCS-42 and HFCS-55.”).   
 229 Corn Refiners Association, supra note 228.  
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fructose used in the defendant’s product.230  However, because food and beverage 
manufacturers are not required to specify which variety of HFCS they used in their 
products, it is difficult to determine whether HFCS manufacturers subject consumers 
to equal health risks.231   
Furthermore, fundamental differences between HFCS and DES preclude a court 
from using market share liability in the context of HFCS litigation.  A major 
difference between the two is that, unlike DES, HFCS’s ability to cause harm is not 
as easily defined because it is one of many ingredients that comprise certain food 
products.  This is especially true where HFCS, with its differing fructose 
concentrations, is present in food in varying quantities and inconsistently consumed.  
DES, however, was a single product, manufactured according to a single industry 
wide formula, ingested by women within the narrowly defined time frame of 
pregnancy, and responsible for a particular type of cancer.232  Because DES posed an 
equivalent risk of harm, irrespective of its particular manufacturer, the court in 
Sindell was more willing to find that a reasonable approximation of a defendant’s 
liability was its proportion of the market share.233   
Even if HFCS plaintiffs could establish that the nature of their disease rendered 
identification of a particular HFCS manufacturer impossible, because HFCS is not 
chemically identical and because there is no available means to determine which 
HFCS-variety a manufacturer produced, courts cannot utilize the market share 
liability approach to provide them a remedy. 
 
VIII. ISSUES OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY LIE AT 
THE HEART OF FOOD LAWSUITS 
 
A. Food Litigation as the New Tobacco 
Before obesity and its associated health consequences grabbed the nation’s 
attention, tobacco use was a major public health concern.  Recent lawsuits against 
the fast food industry, such as Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., are reminiscent of 
tobacco litigation.234  Both include a personal responsibility component, allegations 
that the industries targeted their advertising to children, and the possibility that food 
                                                          
 230 Indeed, current scientific evidence lends support to the notion that a dose-response 
relationship exists between fructose concentration in HFCS and negative health effects.  See 
Bray et al., supra note 23, at 537 (finding that the increased consumption of soft drinks and 
concomitant increase in fructose intake from HFCS and sucrose may be an important 
contributor to the obesity epidemic). 
 231 See id. at 540 (“HFCS is found in most processed foods; however . . . exact 
compositions are not available from either the manufacturer or any publicly available food 
composition table.”). 
 232 See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926. 
 233 Id. at 937. 
 234 For a more in-depth discussion of the parallels between fast food and tobacco litigation, 
see generally Joshua Logan Pennel, Big Food’s Trip Down Tobacco Road: What Tobacco’s 
Past Can Indicate About Food’s Future, 27 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 101 (2008–2009).  
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manufacturers, like “Big Tobacco,” knew of the dangers of their products, yet 
continued to market them.235   
These striking similarities may help assess whether future juries will assign 
liability to food manufacturers when consumers suffer obesity-related injuries.236  
Early tobacco cases faced initial skepticism from the public, who believed that any 
negative health effects from tobacco use were the result of a lack of self-control.237  
Similarly, food plaintiffs today face the all too familiar argument of personal 
responsibility.238  
Lawsuits such as S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. reveal that issues of 
personal autonomy and public accountability affect all food consumers.239  However, 
the idea that HFCS manufacturers should be held strictly liable for causing diabetes 
may not be one that society is ready to accept because it is contrary to societal 
attitudes regarding individual liberty and personal responsibility.240  These principles 
reflect the belief that individuals are free to make their own food choices and must 
take responsibility for the consequences of their actions.241  In other words, allowing 
consumers to blame the food industry for the results of their own bad judgment 
unfairly shifts responsibility from the individual to the manufacturer.242   
                                                          
 235 Cohan, supra note 202, at 110–13; FAULT LINES, supra note 111, at 103–04 (arguing 
that food litigation followed anti tobacco strategists’ three most effective substantive claims: 
1) inadequate disclosure of nutritional content; 2) marketing aimed at impressionable children; 
and 3) increasing public costs of healthcare due to obesity related conditions); see generally 
Jada J. Fehn, The Assault on Bad Food: Tobacco-Style Litigation As An Element of the 
Comprehensive Scheme to Fight Obesity, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 65, 72–76 (2012) (noting the 
similarity between tobacco and food litigation).  
 236 Cohan, supra note 202, at 110.  Cigarettes have been successfully recast in a negative 
light by the “truth campaign,” the largest anti-tobacco movement focused on young people.  
KESSLER, supra note 175, at 247.  The campaign promoted the notion that a person’s desire for 
cigarettes did not come from the individual themselves, but rather from a “manipulative and 
profit-driven industry.”  Id.  The success of this campaign suggests the possibility that 
consumers could be willing to hold the food industry responsible for obesity related 
conditions.  See id. at 247.   
 237 See Fehn, supra note 235, at 73. 
 238 Id. at 75.  The theory of “conditioned hypereating,” proposed by David Kessler, calls 
into question the idea that individuals truly have a choice in what they consume.  KESSLER, 
supra note 175, at 145.  Kessler posits “chronic exposure to highly palatable foods changes 
our brains, conditioning us to seek continued stimulation.  Over time, [the brain develops a 
powerful urge] for a combination of sugar, fat, and salt, [which] competes with our conscious 
capacity to say no.”  Id.   
 239 See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).   
 240 See Ausness, supra note 209, at 887.   
 241 Id.  The importance of moderation and avoidance of excessive food intake dates back to 
the Old Testament, in which God specifically warns against the sin of gluttony.  See Proverbs 
23:2 (New Int’l Version) (“[P]ut a knife to your throat if you are given to gluttony.”); see also 
Proverbs 23:20–21 (New Int’l Version) (“Do not join those who drink too much wine or 
gorge themselves on meat, for drunkards and gluttons become poor, and drowsiness clothes 
them in rags.”). 
 242 This argument, however, becomes less applicable when the injured plaintiffs are 
children.  Children and teenagers do not possess the requisite maturity to understand the 
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Despite increasing rates of obesity, the notion of personal responsibility still 
pervades the public mockery of food lawsuits and underscores legislative attempts 
seeking to hold Americans accountable for what they eat.243 
 
B. Legislative Attempts to Curb Food Litigation 
Recognizing that litigation is a major threat to their industry, food manufacturers 
lobbied members of Congress to introduce legislation that immunized them from 
liability.244  The Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005 
prevented civil liability actions brought against food manufacturers, marketers, 
distributors, advertisers, sellers, and trade associations for claims of injury related to 
an individual’s weight gain, obesity, or any health condition related to such.245  The 
Act asserted that a person’s weight gain, obesity, or obesity-related health condition 
is based on a multitude of factors such that it cannot be attributed to the consumption 
of any particular food product or beverage.246  It also recognized that “lawsuits 
seeking to blame food and beverage providers for a person’s weight gain, obesity, or 
                                                          
consequences of their eating habits.  KAUFMAN, supra note 42, at 219–20.  Consequently, they 
are more susceptible to the aggressive tactics that food manufacturers use to market their 
products.  Fehn, supra note 235, at 69–70; KAUFMAN, supra note 42, at 219-20; KILLER AT 
LARGE: WHY OBESITY IS AMERICA’S GREATEST THREAT (ShineBox Media Prod. 2008) 
(suggesting that junk food marketing to children undermines parental authority to determine 
what their children consume and is a contributory factor to the growing rise in obesity among 
America’s youth).  Junk food marketing is a two billion dollar a year effort by the food 
industry to create brand loyalty among the nation’s young teens and children.  TEDxTalks, 
Marketing Food to Children: Anna Lappe at TEDxManhattan, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2003), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bop3D7-dDM.  The food industry seeks to create brand 
loyalty at a young age because it knows that this loyalty ultimately generates “pester power,” 
which works.  Id.  In fact, 75% of parents reported that they bought something for the first 
time simply because their children asked them to.  Id.  Juries will be more likely to assign 
blame to food sellers when children develop obesity-related health problems associated with 
the consumption of their products.  Alderman & Daynard, supra note 45, at 85 (“Because 
children are more vulnerable than adults due to their lower capacity to evaluate advertising 
objectively, the food industry may be especially vulnerable to claims about misleading 
advertising directed toward children.”).  
 243 See Shirleen Holt, Go Ahead, Splurge on The Bulge, But Any Resulting Fact Is On You, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at A1, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/977597/posts; see infra Part VII(B).  Diners at Seattle’s 5 Spot restaurant must sign a 
waiver promising not to file a lawsuit for any weight gain associated with consuming “The 
Bulge,” a calorie-dense “concoction of sugar-coated fried banana, ice cream, macadamia nuts, 
whipped cream and two kinds of syrup.”  Holt, supra at A1.  The waiver states in relevant 
part, “I promise to release the 5 Spot from all liability of any weight gain that may result from 
ordering and devouring this sinfully fattening treat.  If I have to go to ‘fat camp’ at some time 
in my life, I will not mail my bill to the 5 Spot.”  Id. 
 
 244 KAUFMAN, supra note 42, at 220. 
 245 Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. § 
2(a) (2005).   
 246 Id. at § 2(a)(3). 
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a health condition . . . are not only legally frivolous and economically damaging, but 
also harmful to a healthy America.”247  
Despite being reintroduced three times, the federal Personal Responsibility in 
Food Consumption Act failed to gain enough Congressional support.248  Undaunted, 
the National Restaurant Association, representing large food chains such as 
McDonald’s, has successfully lobbied state legislatures to pass various 
“commonsense consumption” laws.249  These laws, dubbed “Cheeseburger Bills,” 
bar civil lawsuits against food manufacturers seeking recovery for obesity-related 
health conditions.250  Between 2004 and 2012, twenty-five states enacted 
Cheeseburger Bills.251  
Although HFCS litigants may still bring obesity related tort claims against HFCS 
manufacturers in federal court, the enactment of “Commonsense Consumption” laws 
by over twenty-five states demonstrates how organized lobbying efforts, huge 
financial incentives,252 and an increasingly “receptive legislative climate” can 
effectively shield the food industry from liability.253   
                                                          
 247 Id. at § 2(a)(4). 
 248 Melanie Warner, The Food Industry Empire Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at 
CI, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/07/business/07food.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 249 Id.  As recently as July 18, 2013, North Carolina enacted its Commonsense 
Consumption Act, barring civil actions against food and beverage manufacturers from claims 
arising from weight gain, obesity, its associated health conditions, or other conditions likely to 
result from long-term consumption of food.  Commonsense Consumption Act, H.B. 683, 2013 
Gen. Assemb. § 99E-42 (N.C. 2013).  The Act also prohibits local governments from 
regulating the size of soft drinks offered for sale.  Id.   
 250 Cara L. Wilking & Richard A. Daynard, Beyond Cheeseburgers: The Impact of 
Commonsense Consumption Acts on Future Obesity-Related Lawsuits, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
229, 230 (2013).    
 251 Id.  Notably, fifteen of the twenty-five states with the highest obesity rates have enacted 
Commonsense Consumption Acts.  Id. 
 252 Warner, supra note 248 (“[T]he food and restaurant industry gave a total of $5.5 million 
to politicians in the 20 states that have passed laws shielding companies from obesity 
liability.”). 
 253 Id.; see generally Wilking & Daynard, supra note 250, at 230.  Boehmer and colleagues 
investigated state-level childhood obesity prevention legislation in order to analyze 
geographic patterns of bill introduction and adoption.  Tegan K. Boehmer, et al., Patterns of 
Childhood Obesity Prevention Legislation in the United States, 4 PREVENTING CHRONIC 
DISEASE 1, 3–4 (July 2007), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2007/jul/pdf/06_0082.pdf.  During the three-year study period, 
17% of the 717 introduced bills, which related to childhood obesity prevention topics, were 
adopted by the fifty states.  Id. at 3.  None of these adopted bills, however, sought to hold the 
food industry responsible.  See id.  Those bills relating to snack and soda taxes, restaurant 
menu, and product labeling were not adopted by any state legislature.  Id. 




The New York District Court’s ruling in the current HFCS lawsuit will set the 
stage for future food litigation and will determine if courts are willing to accept the 
legal theory that food manufacturers should be held liable for the adverse health 
outcomes associated with their food products.   
Liability is contingent upon plaintiffs proving causation.  In order to demonstrate 
that an exposure or product caused their adverse health outcome, plaintiffs are 
increasingly relying on epidemiologic evidence.  Strict interpretations of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert, erect seemingly insurmountable barriers to 
admitting an expert opinion based on epidemiologic evidence.  Bright-line tests, 
such as a risk ratio threshold of 2.0, do not reflect how practitioners derive causal 
inferences in the field and usually result in the dismissal of otherwise meritorious 
claims.  Instead of utilizing these arbitrary admissibility tests, judges should 
determine the reliability of epidemiologic evidence by examining the methodology 
behind each study.  
Unfortunately, even if HFCS plaintiffs succeeded in establishing causation, 
additional barriers, such as apportioning liability and the battle cry of personal 
responsibility, likely stand in their way.  According to law professor and anti-
tobacco litigator, John Banzhaf III, “as was the case with tobacco, it takes time for 
legal theories to coalesce in a way that forces major societal change.”254  Indeed, the 
line between individual responsibility and public accountability for the economic 
and public health costs of obesity-related health conditions, has yet to be firmly 
drawn in the context of food litigation.255  S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. may 
                                                          
 254 Blaine Harden, Eatery Joins Battle with The Bulge, GUARDIAN WKLY., Sept. 24, 2003, 
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2003/sep/25/guardianweekly.guardianweekly11.  
Following the passage of local laws in New York and California banning trans fat in 
restaurants in 2006 and 2008, respectively, “[o]n [November 7, 2013], the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) announced that it is beginning the process of eliminating artificial trans 
fat from the U.S. food supply.”  Alexandra Sifferlin, Trimming the Fat: A New FDA Effort 
Could Change Junk Food–For the Better, TIME, Nov. 25, 2013, at 21.  Health statistics, such 
as the Center for Disease Control’s estimate that trans fat contributes to 20,000 heart attacks 
each year, “prompted the FDA to declare that trans fats are no longer ‘generally recognized as 
safe.’”  Id.  Acknowledging that it took seven years to mandate disclosure of trans fat on food 
labels, this ban does not mean that trans fat will disappear from store shelves tomorrow.  Id.  
Indeed, because this ban would require many businesses to completely reformulate their food 
production, the FDA is offering a 60-day “commenting period” for food industry advocates to 
suggest a more realistic timeframe.  Id.  Although it may take years before trans fat disappears 
for good, the FDA’s newest effort to curb the obesity epidemic is a step in the right direction.  
Id. 
 255 See Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (“The issue of determining the breadth of personal 
responsibility underlies much of the law: where should the line be drawn between an 
individual’s own responsibility to take care of herself, and society’s responsibility to ensure 
that others shield her?”).  Entitled, “YOU ARE TOO STUPID…to make good personal 
decisions about foods and beverages,” the Center for Consumer Freedom’s ad that was 
launched in response to the New York City Department of Health’s campaign encouraging 
consumers to choose beverages with less sugar, illustrates the current battle between personal 
responsibility and industry accountability.  You are Too Stupid, CENTER FOR CONSUMER 
FREEDOM (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.consumerfreedom.com/2011/12/you-are-too-stupid/; 
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just be one battle in the greater war to hold the food industry responsible for the 
nation’s expanding waistline and its attendant health consequences.  
 
  
                                                          
Press Release #057-09, New York City Dept. of Health, August 31, 2001, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/pr2009/pr057-09.shtml.   
